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1 Introduction 
In a 2017 off-target blast of dicamba, an herbicide used to control broadleaf weeds in 
grain crops in the U.S., news concerning possible herbicide toxicity and herbicide 
commercialization processes headlined the popular media and intensified academic 
discussions. When evaluating what seed variety to select for next year, farmers will now 
have to include newly commercialized dicamba-tolerant seeds in their weed management 
deliberations. What brought on this issue in the first place? The answer is weed resistance 
to multiple groups of herbicides. Since genetically engineered (GE) crops first became 
commercially available in 1996, herbicide-resistant and/or insect-resistant traits have 
provided significant economic and environmental benefits (Brookes and Barfoot, 2008; 
Gianessi et al., 2002; Marra, 2001; Marra, Pardey, and Alston, 2002; National Research 
Council [NRC], 2010; Price et al., 2003; Qaim, 2009; Kleter et al., 2007; Knox et al., 
2006; NRC, 2010; Wossink and Denaux, 2006). While farmers have rapidly adopted GE 
crops and enjoyed gratifying yield increases or cost reductions, these benefits are 
threatened by the evolution of insect and weed resistance (Frisvold and Reeves, 2011; 
Heap, 2011; Tabashnik et al., 2009). This is a socioeconomic and biological problem 
(Hurley and Frisvold, 2016), given the fact that farmers, seed companies, weed scientists 
as well as biological engineers all interact closely through their decision making and 
participation in seed and chemical markets. Therefore, understanding how the economic 
and behavioral incentives are associated with actions of agricultural market players lie at 
the heart of many resistance issues.  
This dissertation deals with different challenges related to farmers’ decision making 
in resistance management. More precisely, questions including how farmers respond to 
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economic and behavioral factors associated with adoption of weed management practices 
(Chapter 2), and how farmers value GE traits in crop seed varieties when the traits are 
bundled in different ways (Chapter 3) are addressed in two separate chapters. Each of 
them is explained in greater detail below.  
Economic and behavior factors related to farmer weed resistance control are 
examined in Chapter 2 (“Economic and Behavioral Drivers of Herbicide Resistance 
Management in the U.S."). First, a theoretical model is constructed to capture farmer’s 
utility maximization problem on his weed resistance management choice. Herbicide 
resistance management features immediate and certain cost, and delayed and uncertain 
benefits (Hurley and Frisvold, 2016), but behavioral factors are also involved in the 
management decision making process. From a theoretical perspective, these factors can 
result in countervailing incentives that challenge policy makers interest in finding the best 
way to motivate farmers and boost the use of weed best management practices. Therefore, 
these incentives must also be explored empirically to better understand their direction and 
magnitude. Through this combination of theory and empirics, a more thorough 
understanding of farmers’ resistance management decisions is obtained for pushing the 
policy debate on herbicide-resistant weeds forward.  
Chapter 3, entitled “Look Inside a Seed: An Analysis of the Demand of Traits in the 
U.S. Corn Seed Market,” deals with the problem of the demand for GE seed varieties and 
GE seed traits under the pressure of pest resistance. After years of exposure to GE traits, 
pests have developed resistance reducing the effectiveness of control. As a result, groups 
of traits have been either stacked and/or pyramided into crop seeds by seed companies 
with the goal of killing pests that are not yet cross-resistant. Despite a higher price, the 
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bundled seed products take over the market rapidly. This may result in hastening pest 
resistance if the bundled seed products, which begin the natural selection for cross-
resistant pests, were introduced into the market earlier than necessary. To study the link 
between seed product adoption and possible biological problems, this chapter investigates 
the value farmers place on the GE seed traits, and different trait combining methods.  
To summarize, this dissertation discusses different challenges that can be encountered 
when interpreting farmers’ choices regarding resistance management, and contributes by 
providing both theoretical and empirical arguments and evidence. The improved 
understanding of farmers’ decision making contributes to sustainable development of 
agricultural production in the long-run.  The theory predictions in Chapter 2 indicate that 
farmers’ resistance management decisions are closely related to the strategic relations 
between farmers’ and neighboring farmers’ management efforts. So are other factors, 
such as subjective beliefs of the likelihood of solutions to the resistance problem. The 
empirical analysis in Chapter 2 takes a broad behavioral and economic perspective to 
examine farmers’ weed management decision.  The results, together with the conceptual 
analysis are of particular use in guiding crop consultants and advisors to provide farmers 
with efficient and effective assistance. Adopting weed resistance practices after resistance 
happens is not enough for long-run agricultural development, which provides a starting 
point for Chapter 3. It is motivated by a highly practical problem: when is the best time to 
introduce different types of seed products. In this case, the evaluations of farmers’ 
willingness to pay for different trait bundles enables researchers to proceed with analysis 
linking seed demand to resistance evolution. 
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2 Economic and Behavioral Drivers of Herbicide Resistance Management in the 
U.S. 
2.1 Introduction 
Weeds are a major constraint for agricultural production. In the interest of sustainable 
agricultural development, this research presents analysis to better understand farmers’ 
weed management choices in U.S. corn, cotton, soybean, and wheat production systems, 
with an emphasis on the diverse weed management tactics recommended by weed 
scientists (Norsworthy et al., 2012; Shaw, 2012). 
Management of weeds in the U.S. has been accomplished primarily with herbicides 
for more than half a century. Repeated and widespread reliance on herbicides has resulted 
in the evolution of herbicide-resistant weeds and increased crop loss due to reduced 
herbicide efficacy. Herbicide resistance evolves when weeds that are susceptible to the 
herbicide are killed by exposure to it and do not reproduce, while weeds that are resistant 
to the herbicide survive exposure and reproduce. 
In the past, new herbicide-resistant weed species were managed through the 
development and release of new herbicide mechanisms of action (MOA, the specific 
biochemical interaction through which the herbicide interrupts new plant growth and 
development). However, two decades ago a different strategy emerged. Corn, cotton, 
soybean and other crops were genetically engineered with tolerance to herbicides, such as 
glyphosate, that have the ability to control a broad spectrum of weeds. This allowed 
farmers to use these herbicides in crops that previously would have been damaged by 
them. It has been more than 30 years since the last new herbicide MOA, 4-
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Hydroxyphenylpyruvate dioxygenase (HPPD) inhibitors, was introduced (in 1982) for 
weed control in row crops (Green, 2014), in part because of the unprecedented adoption 
of glyphosate-tolerant crops and the use of glyphosate. Yet, as of May 2018, with sixteen 
glyphosate-resistant weed species in the U.S. and at least one weed species resistant to 23 
out of the 26 known herbicide MOAs (Heap, 2018), it has become increasingly clear that 
engineering herbicide-tolerant crops is at best, a temporary solution to this weed 
management problem. 
Given that the research and commercial development of a new herbicide can take 11 
years and cost manufacturers between $50 and 70 million (Ollinger and Fernandez-
Cornejo 1995), weed scientists have encouraged farmers to use a more diverse set of 
weed management practices that include cultural (e.g., planting date and narrow rows) 
and mechanical (e.g., cultivation and tillage) in addition to chemical tactics to reduce the 
risk of herbicide-resistant weeds (Norsworthy et al. 2012). Unfortunately, the adoption of 
diverse tactics by farmers has been low.  Furthermore, our understanding of why 
adoption is low is limited because previous research has tended to focus on the adoption 
of an individual tactic (or small set of tactics) or abstracted from specific tactics to 
explore weed management or herbicide resistance management effort in generalities. 
The objective of this research is to identify what factors are most strongly associated 
with a farmer’s use of a diverse range of chemical, mechanical, and cultural weed 
management tactics. This objective is accomplished using 2016 farmer survey data 
collected by Michigan State University.  The survey instrument elicited information on a 
farmer’s 2015 weed management practices, weed management concerns, and most 
important considerations when choosing which weed management tactics to use. 
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Multivariate regression analysis is used to evaluate how weed management decisions 
vary with a range of economic and behavioral factors as well as farmer and farm 
operation characteristics.  When compared to previous literature, the contribution of the 
research is its broader behavioral as well as economic perspective, and the wider array of 
alternative weed management tactics it considers— sixteen in total. The benefit of this 
broader and more comprehensive perspective is the opportunity to identify novel 
pathways for encouraging farmers to proactively manage herbicide resistance.  Such 
pathways can serve as targets for further research, regulatory policy, farmer education, 
and private or public incentives to address the significant challenges posed by herbicide-
resistant weeds to U.S. agriculture. 
The next section frames and motivates the key hypotheses of interest regarding the 
relationships between economic and behavioral factors, and weed management decisions.  
The data that were collected and how they were used to explore these hypotheses is then 
discussed, followed by the results of this analysis.  The final section summarizes our 
findings, while also highlighting their implications. 
2.2 Hypotheses 
The National Academies of Sciences’ National Research Council sponsored the National 
Summit on Strategies for Managing Herbicide-Resistant Weeds in 2012.  A byproduct of 
this summit was a series of workshops and symposia that culminated in a 2016 special 
issue of Weed Science.  Several articles in this special issue (Ward, 2016; Shaw, 2016; 
Jussaume and Ervin, 2016; Hurley and Frisvold, 2016) discuss the challenges of 
herbicide resistant weed management from a human behavioral perspective.   
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Feder, Just, and Zilberman (1985) provide a seminal review of what influences the 
adoption of new agricultural technologies and practices, such as weed and herbicide 
resistance management.  This review identifies familiar socio-demographic factors such 
as farming experience, education, and operation size, noting that the effect of these are 
dependent on technology or tactic specific characteristics.  For example, if a new tactic is 
relatively complex, such as pesticide applications based on randomly sampling pests in a 
field, more educated farmers will be more likely to adopt it. Alternatively, if the practice 
simplifies production decisions at some cost, more educated farmers are less likely to 
adopt it.  In an effort to provide a consistent structure for discussing these alternative 
types of incentives, we propose a stylized two-period model that includes features of risk, 
impatience, self-protection, public-protection, non-pecuniary costs and benefits, 
optimism, and pessimism as well as the standard pecuniary motivations for a farmer’s 
weed management decisions. This model is used to frame explicit hypotheses for further 
empirical scrutiny. 
2.2.1 Theoretical Model 
Consider a farmer 𝑖  deciding how much effort 𝑒𝑖  to devote to using diverse weed 
management more intensively and extensively to reduce the adverse effects of weed 
management, such as the evolution of herbicide resistant weeds. The farmer earns 
contemporary net returns of 𝜋𝑖
0(𝑒𝑖) = 𝑅𝑖(𝑒𝑖) − 𝐶𝑖(𝑒𝑖) based on the effort it devotes to 
more diverse weed management, where 𝑅𝑖(𝑒𝑖) ≥ 0  is a revenue function that is 
increasing in effort at a decreasing rate (
𝜕𝑅𝑖(𝑒𝑖)
𝜕𝑒𝑖
≥ 0 and 
𝜕2𝑅𝑖(𝑒𝑖)
𝜕𝑒𝑖
2 ≤ 0); and 𝐶𝑖(𝑒𝑖) ≥ 0 is a 
cost function that is increasing in effort at an increasing rate (
𝜕𝐶𝑖(𝑒𝑖)
𝜕𝑒𝑖
> 0 and 
𝜕2𝐶𝑖(𝑒𝑖)
𝜕𝑒𝑖
2 ≥ 0).  
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These net returns capture the standard myopic pecuniary benefits and costs of a farmer’s 
weed management decisions.  They do not however capture any potential future 
implications of the farmer’s contemporary weed management decisions or non-pecuniary 
contemporary benefits and costs.  
The future implications of a farmer’s weed management decisions are captured by 
including a second period in the model such that at the beginning of the first period, the 
farmer assesses expected lifetime (two-period) profit and utility of potentially having to 
manage resistant weeds.  Therefore, the second period has two possible states of nature.  
In one state, weed resistance occurs.  In the other state, weed resistance does not occur.  
If resistance occurs, the farmer’s second period profit is 𝜋𝑖
1, while if resistance does not 
emerge the farmer’s second period profit is 𝜋𝑖
2  where 𝜋𝑖
2 > 𝜋𝑖
1  — future weed 
management is less profitable if a farmer has to contend with resistant weeds. Let 𝐸(𝑒𝑖) 
denote the non-pecuniary benefit of the resistant weed management (
𝜕𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖,𝐸𝑖,𝜌𝑖)
𝜕𝐸𝑖
≥ 0). 
𝜕𝐸(𝑒𝑖)
𝜕𝑒𝑖
> 0 represents the non-pecuniary benefit is positive, while 
𝜕𝐸(𝑒𝑖)
𝜕𝑒𝑖
< 0 represents the 
negative non-pecuniary benefit.  
Self-protection, public-protection, optimism, and pessimism are interpreted in the 
model through the probability resistant occurs or does not occur in period 2.  Dentzman, 
Gunderson and Jussaume (2016) finds that many farmers are optimistic that new 
herbicides will likely become available before herbicide resistant weeds become a 
problem.  To capture this optimism, assume a farmer expects resistance will never 
happen with probability 𝜙𝑖  — the larger 𝜙𝑖  the more optimistic the farmer.  
Alternatively, in the event that new herbicides are not forthcoming, a farmer’s and 
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farmer’s neighbors’ efforts to diversify their weed management could reduce the 
probability of resistant weeds.  Let 𝑝𝑖(𝑒𝑖, 𝑒𝑗 , 𝜓𝑖) denote the probability the farmer thinks 
resistance will happen in the second period if new herbicides are not discovered, while 
1 − 𝑝𝑖(𝑒𝑖, 𝑒𝑗 , 𝜓𝑖) denotes the subjective probability that resistance does not happen when 
new herbicides are not discovered. We assume that a farmer’s effort into diverse weed 
management may provide self-protection against weed resistance such that  
𝜕𝑝𝑖(𝑒𝑖,𝑒𝑗,𝜓𝑖)
𝜕𝑒𝑖
<
0  and 
𝜕2𝑝𝑖(𝑒𝑖,𝑒𝑗,𝜓𝑖)
𝜕𝑒𝑖
2 > 0 . Alternatively, the farmer’s neighbors’ efforts 𝑒𝑗   to use more 
diverse weed management practices may also reduce a farmer’s risk of resistance: 
𝜕𝑝𝑖(𝑒𝑖,𝑒𝑗,𝜓𝑖)
𝜕𝑒𝑗
< 0 and 
𝜕2𝑝𝑖(𝑒𝑖,𝑒𝑗,𝜓𝑖)
𝜕𝑒𝑗
2 > 0.  A farmer’s level of pessimism is defined using the 
index parameter 𝜓𝑖  where farmers with a larger value of 𝜓𝑖  believe the marginal 
productivity of their self-protection effort is lower: 
𝜕2𝑝𝑖(𝑒𝑖,𝑒𝑗,𝜓𝑖)
𝜕𝑒𝑖𝜕𝜓𝑖
≥ 0.  Thus, optimism and 
pessimism in the model are differentiated by whether a farmer thinks self-protection is 
unnecessary (optimism) or thinks self-protection is necessary, but not very effective 
(pessimism).  
Risk and impatience are brought into the model by assuming the farmer’s objective 
function is characterized by the discounted expected utility of income function.  Given 
that a farmer’s diverse weed management effort can also affect farmer’s utility from a 
non-pecuniary perspective, following Piggot and Marra (2008), a farmer’s utility function 
is defined to depend directly on a farmer’s diverse weed management effort as well as 
indirectly though the first period profit.  Specifically, the farmer’s utility maximization 
problem is: 
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max
𝑒𝑖
𝐸𝑈𝑖 = 𝛿𝑖(1 − 𝜙𝑖) [𝑝(𝑒𝑖, 𝑒𝑗,𝜓𝑖)𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
1, 𝐸𝑖 , 𝜌𝑖) + (1 − 𝑝(𝑒𝑖, 𝑒𝑗,𝜓𝑖)) 𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
2, 𝐸𝑖, 𝜌𝑖)]
+ 𝛿𝑖𝜙𝑖𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
2, 𝐸𝑖 , 𝜌𝑖) + 𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
0(𝑒𝑖), 𝐸(𝑒𝑖), 𝜌𝑖) 
2.1 
where 𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖, 𝐸𝑖 , 𝜌𝑖)  is the farmers utility function conditional on the realized profit, 
diversity of the farmer’s weed management practices and risk preference; 1 ≥ 𝛿𝑖 ≥ 0 is 
the farmer’s discount factor such that a lower discount factor implies greater impatience 
(e.g., contemporary profits are valued more highly than future profits), and 𝜌𝑖 is an index 
of risk aversion such that a higher value implies the farmer is more averse to risk.  
Assuming farmers are risk averse, the utility function is increasing in profit earned at a 
decreasing rate (
𝜕𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖,𝐸𝑖,𝜌𝑖)
𝜕𝜋𝑖
> 0  and 
𝜕2𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖,𝐸𝑖,𝜌𝑖)
𝜕𝜋𝑖
2 ≤ 0 ).  The utility function is also 
increasing at a decreasing rate in the non-pecuniary index Ei (e.g., the sign of 
𝜕𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖,𝐸𝑖,𝜌𝑖)
𝜕𝐸𝑖
 
and 
𝜕2𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖,𝐸𝑖,𝜌𝑖)
𝜕𝐸𝑖
2 ).  The first two terms of equation 2.1 represent expected utility in period 
2, in which, the first term is the expected utility that the farmer thinks resistance may 
happen in period 2, and the second term is the expected utility that the farmer thinks 
resistance will never happen. The third term in equation 2.1 is the utility of the pecuniary 
and non-pecuniary benefits from managing resistance in period 1.  
The first-order condition (FOC) for an interior solution to equation 2.1 is  
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𝜕𝐸𝑈𝑖
𝜕𝑒𝑖
= 𝛿𝑖(1 − 𝜙𝑖)
𝜕𝑝𝑖(𝑒𝑖 , 𝑒𝑗, 𝜓𝑖)
𝜕𝑒𝑖
(𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
1, 𝐸𝑖, 𝜌𝑖) − 𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
2, 𝐸𝑖 , 𝜌𝑖))
+
𝜕𝐸𝑖(𝑒𝑖)
𝜕𝑒𝑖
{𝛿𝑖(1 − 𝜙𝑖) (𝑝𝑖(𝑒𝑖 , 𝑒𝑗 , 𝜓𝑖)
𝜕𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
1, 𝐸𝑖, 𝜌𝑖)
𝜕𝐸𝑒𝑖
+ (1 − 𝑝𝑖(𝑒𝑖 , 𝑒𝑗, 𝜓𝑖))
𝜕𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
2, 𝐸𝑖, 𝜌𝑖)
𝜕𝐸𝑒𝑖
) + 𝛿𝑖𝜙𝑖
𝜕𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
2, 𝐸𝑖 , 𝜌𝑖)
𝜕𝐸𝑒𝑖
+
𝜕𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
0, 𝐸𝑖 , 𝜌𝑖)
𝜕𝐸𝑖
} +
𝜕𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
0, 𝐸𝑖, 𝜌𝑖)
𝜕𝜋𝑖
(
𝜕𝑅𝑖(𝑒𝑖)
𝜕𝑒𝑖
−
𝜕𝐶𝑖(𝑒𝑖)
𝜕𝑒𝑖
) = 0 , 
 
2.2 
or 
 
𝜕𝑅𝑖(𝑒𝑖)
𝜕𝑒𝑖
−
𝜕𝐶𝑖(𝑒𝑖)
𝜕𝑒𝑖
= −
𝜕2𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
0, 𝐸𝑖, 𝜌𝑖)
𝜕𝜋𝑖2
𝜕𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
0, 𝐸𝑖, 𝜌𝑖)
𝜕𝜋𝑖
𝛿𝑖(1 − 𝜙𝑖)
𝜕𝑝𝑖(𝑒𝑖 , 𝐸𝑗 , 𝜓𝑖)
𝜕𝑒𝑖
𝜕2𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
0, 𝐸𝑖 , 𝜌𝑖)
𝜕𝜋𝑖2
(𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
1, 𝐸𝑖, 𝜌𝑖)
− 𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
2, 𝐸𝑖, 𝜌𝑖))  
−
𝜕𝐸(𝑒𝑖)
𝜕𝑒𝑖
{
 
 
 
 
𝛿𝑖(1 − 𝜙𝑖)
(
 
 
𝑝𝑖(𝑒𝑖 , 𝑒𝑗, 𝜓𝑖)
𝜕𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
1, 𝐸𝑖 , 𝜌𝑖)
𝜕𝐸𝑖
𝜕𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
0, 𝐸𝑖 , 𝜌𝑖)
𝜕𝜋𝑖
+ (1 − 𝑝𝑖(𝑒𝑖, 𝑒𝑗 , 𝜓𝑖))
𝜕𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
2, 𝐸𝑖, 𝜌𝑖)
𝜕𝐸𝑖
𝜕𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
0, 𝐸𝑖, 𝜌𝑖)
𝜕𝜋𝑖 )
 
 
+ 𝛿𝑖𝜙𝑖
𝜕𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
2, 𝐸𝑖, 𝜌𝑖)
𝜕𝐸𝑖
𝜕𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
0, 𝐸𝑖, 𝜌𝑖)
𝜕𝜋𝑖
+
𝜕𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
0, 𝐸𝑖 , 𝜌𝑖)
𝜕𝐸𝑖
𝜕𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
0, 𝐸𝑖 , 𝜌𝑖)
𝜕𝜋𝑖 }
 
 
 
 
 . 
For farm-utility maximization, the impact of resistance management effort on 
contemporary profit (bottom left-hand-side of equation 2.2) should be equal to the impact 
on expected future profit (bottom right-hand-side of equation 2.2) and any contemporary 
non-pecuniary benefits or costs.  In other words, the marginal reduction in contemporary 
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utility due to management effort costs should be equal to the potential marginal benefit 
the effort may bring in future periods. 
2.2.2 Testable Hypotheses 
A number of predictions emerge from this model. We develop the comparative statics 
and other relations associated with condition 2.2 below, and generate testable hypotheses 
for our empirical analysis. For Hypotheses I-III, we assume there are no non-pecuniary 
effects of management effort on utility (i.e., 
𝜕𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖,𝐸𝑖,𝜌𝑖)
𝜕𝐸𝑖
=
𝜕2𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖,𝐸𝑖,𝜌𝑖)
𝜕𝐸𝑖
2 = 0). 
Hurley and Frisvold (2016) expands on the implications of risk raised by Feder, Just, 
and Zilberman (1985) with the present bias types of behavior identified in Laibson 
(1997).  They note that while the cost of herbicide resistance management is immediate 
and certain, the benefits are delayed and uncertain, both of which can discourage 
adoption when farmers are risk averse and exceedingly impatient due to present bias. 
This leads us to Hypothesis I. 
Hypothesis I Farmers who are a) more averse to risk or b) less patient use diverse 
weed management tactics less intensively and less extensively. 
Support for part a) of this hypothesis can be demonstrated with the model assuming 
neighboring farmers’ use of diverse weed management has a negligible effect on the 
farmer’s probability of resistance (e.g., 
𝜕𝑝𝑖(𝑒𝑖,𝑒𝑗,𝜓𝑖)
𝜕𝑒𝑗
=
𝜕2𝑝𝑖(𝑒𝑖,𝑒𝑗,𝜓𝑖)
𝜕𝑒𝑗
2 = 0 ) and by 
recognizing that 𝜌𝑖 = −
𝜕2𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
0,𝐸𝑖,𝜌𝑖)
𝜕𝜋𝑖
2
𝜕𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
0,𝐸𝑖,𝜌𝑖)
𝜕𝜋𝑖
 is the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of absolute risk 
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aversion. Assuming a farmer’s risk preferences exhibit constant absolute risk aversion 
(CARA), equation 2.2, and the implicit function theorem imply 
𝑑𝑒𝑖
𝑑𝜌𝑖
= −
𝜕2𝐸𝑈𝑖
𝜕𝑒𝑖𝜕𝜌𝑖
𝜕2𝐸𝑈𝑖
𝜕𝑒𝑖
2
 ∝  
−
𝜕2𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
0,𝐸𝑖,𝜌𝑖)
𝜕𝜋𝑖𝜕𝜌𝑖
𝜕𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
0,𝐸𝑖,𝜌𝑖)
𝜕𝜋𝑖
𝜌𝑖
+
𝜕(𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
2,𝐸𝑖,𝜌𝑖)−𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
1,𝐸𝑖,𝜌𝑖))
𝜕𝜌
𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
2,𝐸𝑖,𝜌𝑖)−𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
1,𝐸𝑖,𝜌𝑖)
.1 
2.3 
For equation 2.3 to yield a negative sign that is consistent with Hypothesis I, 
𝜕2𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
0,𝐸𝑖,𝜌𝑖)
𝜕𝜋𝑖𝜕𝜌𝑖
> 0  and 
𝜕(𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
2,𝐸𝑖,𝜌𝑖)−𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
1,𝐸𝑖,𝜌𝑖))
𝜕𝜌𝑖
< 0 . However, with expected utility theory, 
increasing risk aversion is associated with increased concavity of the utility function in 
terms of profit, which is inconsistent with the assumption 
𝜕2𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
0,𝐸𝑖,𝜌𝑖)
𝜕𝜋𝑖𝜕𝜌𝑖
> 0. Therefore, the 
model’s prediction for the impact of increased risk aversion on the use of more diverse 
weed management practices is not definitive.  
Similarly, by equation 2.2 and the implicit function theorem: 
𝑑𝑒𝑖
𝑑𝛿𝑖
= −
𝜕2𝐸𝑈𝑖
𝜕𝑒𝑖𝜕𝛿𝑖
𝜕2𝐸𝑈𝑖
𝜕𝑒𝑖
2
 ∝  (1 − 𝜙𝑖)
𝜕𝑝𝑖(𝑒𝑖,𝑒𝑗,𝜓𝑖)
𝜕𝑒𝑖
(𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
1, 𝐸𝑖 ,𝜌𝑖) − 𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
2, 𝐸𝑖 ,𝜌𝑖)) > 0.
 2
 2.4 
With a lower discount factor, the farmer is less patient and will devote less effort to 
resistance management by using fewer and less diverse weed management practices. 
Recall that Dentzman, Gunderson and Jussaume (2016) finds that many farmers are 
optimistic about the possibility that new herbicides will become available to solve 
herbicide resistant weed problem.  Alternatively, other farmers are pessimistic about their 
own ability to reduce the risk of herbicide resistant weeds.  Regardless, both these types 
                                                 
1 See the appendix for a more detailed proof of this result. 
2 See the appendix for a more detailed proof of this result. 
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of farmers are unlikely to see the benefit of using more diverse weed management tactics 
to reduce the risk of herbicide resistant weeds: 
Hypothesis II Farmers who are more a) optimistic about the likelihood of weed 
resistance or b) pessimistic about the effectiveness of resistance management efforts 
use diverse weed management tactics less intensively and less extensively. 
In our model, 𝜙𝑖  captures the effect of optimism by changing the probability of 
outcomes in period 2. By equation 2.2 and the implicit function theorem:  
𝑑𝑒𝑖
𝑑𝜙𝑖
= −
𝜕2𝐸𝑈𝑖
𝜕𝑒𝑖𝜕𝜙𝑖
𝜕2𝐸𝑈𝑖
𝜕𝑒𝑖
2
∝ −𝛿𝑖
𝜕𝑝𝑖(𝑒𝑖,𝑒𝑗,𝜓𝑖)
𝜕𝑒𝑖
(𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
1, 𝐸𝑖,𝜌𝑖) − 𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
2, 𝐸𝑖,𝜌𝑖)) < 0.
 3
 2.5 
Farmers who are pessimistic tend to challenge the effectiveness of resistance 
management efforts. This can be shown as 
𝜕2𝑝𝑖(𝑒𝑖,𝑒𝑗,𝜓𝑖)
𝜕𝑒𝑖𝜕𝜓𝑖
> 0 , where pessimism 𝜓𝑖 
degrades the perceived effectiveness of self-protection effort (
𝜕𝑝𝑖(𝑒𝑖,𝑒𝑗,𝜓𝑖)
𝜕𝑒𝑖
), such that  
𝑑𝑒𝑖
𝑑𝜓𝑖
= −
𝜕2𝐸𝑈𝑖
𝜕𝑒𝑖𝜕𝜓𝑖
𝜕2𝐸𝑈𝑖
𝜕𝑒𝑖
2
∝ 𝛿𝑖(1 − 𝜙𝑖)
𝜕2𝑝𝑖(𝑒𝑖,𝑒𝑗,𝜓𝑖)
𝜕𝑒𝑖𝜕𝜓𝑖
(𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
1, 𝐸𝑖 ,𝜌𝑖) − 𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
2, 𝐸𝑖 ,𝜌𝑖)) < 0.
 4
 2.6 
Hence, either being optimistic or pessimistic about the likelihood of solutions to 
herbicide resistant weed problems, farmers are predicted to use fewer and less diverse 
weed management tactics.  Both these results also assume neighboring farmers’ use of 
diverse weed management has a negligible effect on the farmer’s probability of resistance. 
Miranowski and Carlson’s (1986) seminal article considered the relationship between 
pest mobility and the evolution of pesticide resistance. They argued that with an 
                                                 
3
 See the appendix for a more detailed proof of this result. 
4
 See the appendix for a more detailed proof of this result. 
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immobile pest population, farmers would have private incentives to manage pesticide 
resistance.  Alternatively, a mobile pest is argued to reduce incentives for a farmer to 
manage pesticide resistance because resistance can still spread to the farmer’s field from 
neighbors’ fields, which frames the hypothesis: 
Hypothesis III: Farmers who are less concerned about weed mobility use diverse 
weed management tactics more intensively and more extensively. 
Suppose there is greater mobility so neighbors’ efforts have a bigger impact on 
farmer i’s decision making.  To capture this in the model suppose 𝑝𝑖(𝑒𝑖, 𝑒𝑗 , 𝜓𝑖) =
𝑝𝑖(𝑒𝑖, 𝛼𝑖𝑒𝑗, 𝜓𝑖)|𝛼𝑖=1
 and consider the effect of increasing 𝛼𝑖. With mobile weeds and a 
neighboring farmer’s effort affecting a farmer’s weed management effort, 
𝜕𝑝𝑖(𝑒𝑖,𝑒𝑗,𝜓𝑖)
𝜕𝑒𝑗
< 0 
and 
𝜕2𝑝𝑖(𝑒𝑖,𝑒𝑗,𝜓𝑖)
𝜕𝑒𝑗
2 > 0  creating the strategic interactions between farmers describe by 
Miranowski and Carlson’s (1986).  To incorporate these strategic interactions into the 
analysis, assume there are two farmers with analogous first order conditions described by 
equation 2.2.  Applying the implicit function theorem and Cramer's rule to equation 2.2, 
yields  
𝑑𝑒𝑖
𝑑𝛼𝑖
|
𝛼𝑖=1
= − |
|
𝜕2𝐸𝑈𝑖
𝜕𝑒𝑖𝜕𝛼𝑖
𝜕2𝐸𝑈𝑖
𝜕𝑒𝑖𝜕𝑒𝑗
0
𝜕2𝐸𝑈𝑗
𝜕𝑒𝑗2
|
|
|
|
𝜕2𝐸𝑈𝑖
𝜕𝑒𝑖2
𝜕2𝐸𝑈𝑖
𝜕𝑒𝑖𝜕𝑒𝑗
𝜕2𝐸𝑈𝑗
𝜕𝑒𝑗𝜕𝑒𝑖
𝜕2𝐸𝑈𝑗
𝜕𝑒𝑗2
|
|
−1
. 5 
 
                                                 
5
 See the appendix for a more detailed proof of this result. 
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The sign of 
𝑑𝑒𝑖
𝑑𝛼𝑖
|
𝛼𝑖=1
 depends on two mixed partial derivatives, 
𝜕2𝑝𝑖(𝑒𝑖,𝑒𝑗,𝜓𝑖)
𝜕𝑒𝑖𝜕𝑒𝑗
 and 
𝜕2𝑝𝑗(𝑒𝑖,𝑒𝑗,𝜓𝑖)
𝜕𝑒𝑗𝜕𝑒𝑖
, which is summarized in Table 2.1.  These results indicate when a farmer’s 
and neighboring farmers’ efforts are mutual strategic substitutes (
𝜕2𝑝𝑖(𝑒𝑖,𝑒𝑗,𝜓𝑖)
𝜕𝑒𝑖𝜕𝑒𝑗
> 0 and 
𝜕2𝑝𝑗(𝑒𝑖,𝑒𝑗,𝜓𝑖)
𝜕𝑒𝑗𝜕𝑒𝑖
> 0) or mutual strategic complements (
𝜕2𝑝𝑖(𝑒𝑖,𝑒𝑗,𝜓𝑖)
𝜕𝑒𝑖𝜕𝑒𝑗
< 0 and 
𝜕2𝑝𝑗(𝑒𝑖,𝑒𝑗,𝜓𝑖)
𝜕𝑒𝑗𝜕𝑒𝑖
< 0) 
increasing the effectiveness of neighbors’ efforts may increase or decrease a farmer’s 
own effort to lower the likelihood of resistance resulting in either improved cooperation 
or exacerbated free-riding. Alternatively, when the neighboring farmers’ efforts are a 
strategic substitute for a farmer’s own effort (
𝜕2𝑝𝑖(𝑒𝑖,𝑒𝑗,𝜓𝑖)
𝜕𝑒𝑖𝜕𝑒𝑗
> 0) and a farmer’s effort is a 
strategic complement for neighboring farmers’ efforts (
𝜕2𝑝𝑗(𝑒𝑖,𝑒𝑗,𝜓𝑖)
𝜕𝑒𝑗𝜕𝑒𝑖
< 0), the increasing 
effectiveness of neighbors’ efforts exacerbates the farmer’s free-riding (
𝑑𝑒𝑖
𝑑𝛼𝑖
|
𝛼𝑖=1
< 0).  
When the neighboring farmers’ efforts are a strategic complement for a farmer’s effort 
(
𝜕2𝑝𝑖(𝑒𝑖,𝑒𝑗,𝜓𝑖)
𝜕𝑒𝑖𝜕𝑒𝑗
< 0) and a farmer’s effort is a strategic substitute for neighboring farmers’ 
efforts (
𝜕2𝑝𝑗(𝑒𝑖,𝑒𝑗,𝜓𝑖)
𝜕𝑒𝑗𝜕𝑒𝑖
> 0), the increasing effectiveness of neighbors’ efforts improves the 
farmer’s cooperation (
𝑑𝑒𝑖
𝑑𝛼𝑖
|
𝛼𝑖=1
> 0). Thus, support for Miranowski and Carlson’s (1986) 
free riding hypothesis is not as definitive in the model. 
The rapid adoption of herbicide tolerant soybean when it was first introduced seemed 
paradoxical with initial estimates of profitability that were not significantly different from 
conventional soybean (e.g., Fernandez-Cornejo, Klotz-Ingram, and Jans 2002).  The 
resolution of this paradox was a series of articles that showed farmers’ decisions are often 
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driven by more than just profitability.  Indeed, factors like ease of use; human and 
environmental safety; yield and yield loss; and crop prices and pesticide costs can be 
important (e.g., Carpenter and Gianessi 1999; Fernandez-Cornejo, Hendricks, and Mishra 
2005; Piggott and Marra 2008; Bonny 2008; Hurley, Mitchell, and Frisvold 2009).  Since 
the use of more diverse management practices is not easy; can reduce the use of 
herbicides that have a negative impact on human and environmental safety; can increase 
yields by reducing yield losses; and reduce herbicide costs, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis IV: Farmers who are a) less concerned about ease of use, or are more 
concerned about b) human and environmental safety, c) yield and yield loss, or d) 
herbicide costs use diverse weed management tactics more intensively and more 
extensively. 
Support for this hypothesis can be most easily seen using a comparative equilibrium 
analysis with the bottom equation in 2.2 assuming that the self- and public-protection 
benefits of using more diverse weed management effort are negligible (i.e., 
𝜕𝑝𝑖(𝑒𝑖,𝑒𝑗,𝜓𝑖)
𝜕𝑒𝑖
=
𝜕𝑝𝑖(𝑒𝑖,𝑒𝑗,𝜓𝑖)
𝜕𝑒𝑗
= 0): 
𝜕𝑅𝑖(𝑒𝑖)
𝜕𝑒𝑖
−
𝜕𝐶𝑖(𝑒𝑖)
𝜕𝑒𝑖
 
= −
𝜕𝐸(𝑒𝑖)
𝜕𝑒𝑖
{
 
 
𝛿𝑖(1 − 𝜙𝑖) (𝑝𝑖(𝑒𝑖 , 𝑒𝑗 , 𝜓𝑖)
𝜕𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
1, 𝐸𝑖 , 𝜌𝑖)
𝜕𝑒𝑖𝐸
𝜕𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
0, 𝐸𝑖 , 𝜌𝑖)
𝜕𝜋𝑖
+ (1 − 𝑝𝑖(𝑒𝑖 , 𝑒𝑗, 𝜓𝑖))
𝜕𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
2, 𝐸𝑖 , 𝜌𝑖)
𝜕𝐸𝑒𝑖
𝜕𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
0, 𝐸𝑖 , 𝜌𝑖)
𝜕𝜋𝑖
)
− ∓𝛿𝑖𝜙𝑖
𝜕𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
2, 𝐸𝑖 , 𝜌𝑖)
𝜕𝐸𝑒𝑖
𝜕𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
0, 𝐸𝑖 , 𝜌𝑖)
𝜕𝜋𝑖
−∓
𝜕𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
2, 𝐸𝑖 , 𝜌𝑖)
𝜕𝐸𝑒𝑖
𝜕𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
0, 𝐸𝑖 , 𝜌𝑖)
𝜕𝜋𝑖 }
 
 
 
2.7 
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Suppose there were no non-pecuniary benefits (
𝜕𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖,𝐸𝑖,𝜌𝑖)
𝜕𝐸𝑖
𝜕𝐸𝑖(𝑒𝑖)
𝜕𝑒𝑖
= 0 ), if an interior 
solution exists, the optimal diversity of weed management effort 𝑒𝑖
∗ would solve 
𝜕𝑅𝑖(𝑒𝑖
∗)
𝜕𝑒𝑖
−
𝜕𝐶𝑖(𝑒𝑖
∗)
𝜕𝑒𝑖
= 0. However, when we examine a positive non-pecuniary factor (
𝜕𝐸𝑖(𝑒𝑖)
𝜕𝑒𝑖
> 0), 
such as the concerns about human and environmental safety, the right-hand side of 
equation 2.7 must be negative implying the 𝑒𝑖
∗∗  solving equation 2.7 would require 
𝜕𝑅𝑖(𝑒𝑖
∗∗)
𝜕𝑒𝑖
−
𝜕𝐶𝑖(𝑒𝑖
∗∗)
𝜕𝑒𝑖
< 0  (e.g., Figure 2.1). Since marginal revenue is decreasing and 
marginal cost is increasing in effort, this result implies that positive non-pecuniary factors 
will increase effort devoted diversifying weed management practices.  On the other hand, 
examining a negative non-pecuniary factor (
𝜕𝐸𝑖(𝑒𝑖)
𝜕𝑒𝑖
< 0), such as concerns about the ease 
of use, the right-hand side of equation 2.7 must be positive implying the 𝑒𝑖
∗∗∗ solving 
equation 2.7 would require 
𝜕𝑅𝑖(𝑒𝑖
∗∗∗)
𝜕𝑒𝑖
−
𝜕𝐶𝑖(𝑒𝑖
∗∗∗)
𝜕𝑒𝑖
> 0 (e.g., Figure 2.1) with a farmer using 
fewer and less diverse weed management practices to control resistant weeds. Empirical 
support for these hypotheses is now explored using data from a U.S. farm level weed 
management survey that was conducted during the winter of 2016. 
2.3 Data Description and Method 
2.3.1 Data Description 
The weed management survey was conducted by the office for Survey Research, Institute 
for Public Policy and Social Research at Michigan State University. A total of 8,237 
farmers from 28 predominately corn, cotton, soybean, and wheat producing states were 
surveyed using a full mixed mode method.  That is, respondents were first sent an e-mail 
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invitation to complete the survey using the internet.  Invitations that did not receive a 
response received a mail version of the survey approximately one month later. The 
survey instrument was designed by economists, weed scientists and sociologists from 
Iowa State University, Michigan State University, University of Minnesota, North 
Carolina State University, University of Arkansas, University of Arizona and Portland 
State University. The survey design did not target specific crops, but general weed 
management practices instead. The survey screened participants to ensure that the 
respondents were involved in a farming operation at the time the survey was conducted. 
Also, to qualify for the survey, they had to be involved in making weed management 
decisions for the farming operation. 
The survey started by asking questions about weed management strategies and 
practices in 2015, including types of field crops planted, total cropped acres, important 
non-monetary considerations for making weed management decisions, and weed 
management practices that were used by the respondent in the 2014-15 growing seasons. 
Then, questions about herbicide resistant weed knowledge and management were asked, 
including concerns about possible herbicide resistant weeds encroaching from 
neighboring farms, and sources of help with herbicide resistant weed problems. These 
two sections were followed by questions about the 2015 growing season, including 
farmer and farm operation demographics (age, gender, farming experience, household 
income, income sources, and willingness to take risks and be patient).  
A total of 724 responses were collected with 587 observations having complete 
enough information for analysis. The list of the states is presented in Table 2.3. 
Compared to the United States Department of Agriculture 2012 Agricultural Census 
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(USDA NASS 2012), the proportion of acres for each state in the survey deviated, 
sometimes substantially, from the proportion of acres reported by survey respondents. 
This is particularly true of the southern states of Arizona, Arkansas, Louisiana, and 
Mississippi, which were over represented in our responses, and northern states of Iowa, 
Missouri, and Ohio, which were under represented. Panel A in Table 2.4 displays the 
distribution of farm sizes in the survey sample, and compares this proportion to the 
Census of Agriculture Data. More than 90% of the farms in the survey had more than 180 
acres, whereas in the census, farms with 10 to 179 acres occupied the majority among all 
farms in the 28 states in 2012. Thus, the survey over-represents farms with more than 500 
acres, and under-represents farms that were less than 180 acres. Even though the survey 
response was skewed toward larger size farms, around 14% of the surveyed farms were 
below 250 acres. Compared to previous farmer surveys concerning weed management 
and relying on sampling frames that only included farms planting, at a minimum, 250 
acres of corn, soybeans or cotton, this survey included more smaller scale farmers (Marra 
et al., 2004; Foresman and Glasgow, 2008; Johnson et al., 2009; Givens et al., 2011; 
Frisvold et al., 2009; Hurley et al., 2009).  
Turning to Panel B in Table 2.4, over 99% of the respondents were male with an 
average of 35.7 years farming and a standard deviation of 12.6 years. More than 66% of 
respondents reported that the farming operation was the major source of their household 
income, and about half had 2014 before tax household income of more than $100,000, 
which exceeds $22,840 average in the 2012 Census of Agriculture (USDA NASS 2012). 
More than sixty percent of respondents reported a household income range of $50,000-
$250,000, and only 2.7% of them claimed a household income of less than $25,000. 
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Almost none of the farms covered in the survey used organic methods or had certified 
organic operations. 
Farmers were also asked about the types of field crops planted on their farming 
operation in 2015. The clear majority of farms (94.0%) dealt with multiple types of field 
crops from corn, cotton, soybean, sugar beet, rice, and wheat, to other crops, such as 
tobacco and alfalfa. Farmers dealing with two crops accounted for the highest proportion, 
43.8%, followed by the proportion of farmers with three crops, 33.9%. Summing up the 
number of farms, Figure 2.2 compares the observed land use across 15 regions/states. 
Corn, soybean and wheat were the three crops that were most broadly planted. Cotton 
was not reported as an important cultivated crop in most of the states, except some 
southern states, such as Texas (20 out of 39 farms) and Louisiana (6 out of 23 farms). We 
grouped states to convey the regional differences in the types of field crops, and used 
these state groups in our regression analysis to help conserve degrees of freedom. 
2.3.2  Variables for Analysis 
2.3.2.1 Response Variables 
The goal of the study is to identify what behavioral and economic factors are most 
strongly associated with a farmer’s choice over cultural, mechanical and chemical tactics 
of weed control as well as the diversity of a farmer’s choices over these tactics. The 
cultural tactics include crop rotation, high seeding rates, choice of planting date to reduce 
weed competition, planting in narrow rows, and use of weed maps. Mechanical tactics 
include inter-row cultivation, tillage, hand weeding, and use of cover crops and mulches. 
The chemical tactics include pre-emergent, post-emergent and post-harvest herbicide 
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applications. Herbicide use is further explored in terms of the use of herbicide mixes, 
multiple herbicides, full labeled herbicide application rates, and herbicide mechanism of 
action (MOA) rotation. All the items included in the three types of tactics were in the list 
for the question “Over the past two years, on what percentage of your fields on your 
entire farming operation did you use each of the methods to control weeds?” Responses 
were on a six-point scale (1: did not use, 2: <20%, 3: 20-39%, 4: 40-59%, 5: 60-79%, 
and 6: 80%-100%). The methods are not mutually exclusive, so multiple methods within 
and across groups can be applied simultaneously on the same fields. Table 2.4 shows the 
distribution of responses for all weed control techniques.  Nonresponses, which range 
from 0.9 to 7.2%, were coded as did not use to preserve sample size for further analysis. 
From Table 2.4, two results are clear. First, the patterns of the reported control 
tactics’ application rates are different across the three practice groups. Chemical tactics 
were most broadly applied. Second, the patterns of the reported control tactics’ 
application rates are different across practices within each tactic group. In the mechanical 
control tactic group, tillage was widely used, while most respondents did not use inter-
row cultivation at all. Similar contrasts can be found between post-emergent and post-
harvest herbicide use in the chemical control tactic group, and between crop rotation and 
weed maps in cultural control tactic group. Methods included in the herbicide application 
method group share the highest degree of similarity in use rates.  
In Table 2.4 continued, we also compare the distributions of control tactics’ 
application rates between large farms (>250 acres) and small farms (<=250 acres). It is 
obvious that, smaller farms used less of cultural and mechanical control tactics, but more 
of chemical control tactics when compared to larger farms. 
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2.3.2.2 Control Variables 
The main variables we explore in relation to variation in weed management tactics fall 
into five categories: farmer and farm characteristics, risk and time preferences, key weed 
management concerns, concerns about resistant weeds encroaching from neighbors’ 
fields, and pessimistic and optimistic attitudes toward herbicide resistance. 
Farmer and farm characteristics included gender, years farming, years of education, 
and farm size measured by total cropped acres. Studies show that having more education 
or less experience (perhaps being younger) is significantly and positively associated with 
adopting more resistant weed management (Frisvold, Hurley and Mitchell, 2009; Dong, 
Mitchell, Hurley and Frisvold, 2016). Since information on a farmer’s age was collected 
but information on a farmer’s education was not, we used the Mincer equation to infer 
years of education.  In the Mincer equation (Mincer 1958, 1974), educational attainment 
is summarized by years of education, with work experience measured as age minus years 
of education and minus 6 pre-education years. Accordingly, we calculated a farmer’s 
years of education as a farmer’s age minus the number of years farming and minus 6 pre-
education years. 
Dohmen et al. (2011) proposes and validates a simple scale for measuring individual 
risk preferences. More recently, Roe (2015) successfully uses this scale to compare small 
business owners’ and farmers’ risk preferences. Becker et al. (2012) uses this simple 
scale in conjunction with an analogous time preference or patience scale to further 
explore the relationship between risk and time preferences, and other psychological 
characteristics.  Adopting these scales for our research, respondents were asked to use a 
ten-point scale (1: don’t like to take risks to 10: fully prepared to take risks) to describe 
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their attitudes toward risk. For time preferences, respondents were asked to use a ten-
point scale (1: very impatient to 10: very patient) to describe their time preference or 
level of patience.  We scaled both measures to the unit interval by dividing by ten.  These 
variables are used individually as well as interacted since time is a key factor in resolving 
risks.  
Following Hurley, Frisvold, and Mitchell (2009), and Hurley and Mitchell (2017), 
weed management concerns were measured by asking: “How important are each of the 
following to you?” This question was followed by the twelve statements in Table 2.5 that 
relate to a farmer’s weed management decisions. The response options were a five-point 
Likert scale (1: not important at all to 5: very important). Table 2.5 also reports the 
average and standard deviation of responses. By conducting a factor analysis, we reduce 
this list of twelve items to four factor scores based on the correlation in farmers’ 
responses.
6
 The number of significant factors is chosen using the parallel analysis 
paradigm with a 10% level of significance (Ledesma and Valero-Mora 2007). The factor 
loadings and uniqueness values for this analysis are reported in Table 2.6. The first of the 
four factor scores is referred to as Human & Environmental Safety Concern due to high 
loadings on Protecting Water Quality, Protecting Wildlife, Worker Safety, and 
Controlling Soil Erosion. The second is referred to as Ease of Use Concern due to its 
high loadings on Simplicity, Convenience, and Flexibility. The third is referred to as Yield 
& Yield Loss Concern due to high loadings on Having Residual Control, Having Long 
                                                 
6 This was accomplished using Stata’s factor command with four factors retained, followed by the 
rotate command with the varimax option.  The predict command was then used to generate factor 
scores based on the default regression method. 
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Lasting Weed Control, and Protecting Yield. The fourth is referred to as Prices & Costs 
Concern with high loadings on Commodity Price and Herbicide Cost. 
Measuring concerns about weed mobility was accomplished using the question “To 
which extent do you agree or disagree with the following,” which was followed by the 
first five statements listed in Table 2.7.  The table also includes the average and standard 
deviation of farmers’ responses.  Responses were measured on a five-point Likert scale 
(1: Strongly Disagree to 5: Strongly Agree).  As with the key weed management 
concerns, a factor analysis is used to reduce these five variables to two factor scores.  The 
loadings for these two factors are reported in the top half of Table 2.8.  The loadings for 
the first factor, which we refer to as Weed Mobility Concern, shows concerns for weeds 
coming in from operations in other regions of the country as well as neighboring counties 
and farms.  Loadings for the second factor, which we refer to as Neighbor Resistance 
Concern, are smaller overall, but with negative weights on resistance spreading from 
other regions and counties, and positive weights for concerns related to a farmer’s own 
land relative to rented land, and the ineffectiveness of a farmer’s own resistance 
management efforts due to resistance spilling over from neighbors’ fields. 
To measure how optimistic or pessimistic farmers are about the prospects of solving 
herbicide resistant weed problems, a five-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree to 5 = 
strongly agree) is used with the seven statements at the bottom of Table 2.7.  Two factors 
are derived from farmers’ responses to these statements using the same methods as 
previously described.  The first factor weighs most heavily on statements related to 
continual issues with herbicide resistance (Table 2.8), which leads us to refer to it as 
Pessimistic Weed Resistance Attitudes.  The second factor weighs most heavily the 
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prospect of being able to solve the problem with a new herbicide and without an 
organized community effort, which lead us to refer to it as Optimistic Weed Resistance 
Attitudes.  
In summary (Table 2.9), the control variables included in the analyses are crop acres, 
gender, farming years, education years, risk and time preference, other concerns, and 
regional fixed effects to control the spatial and geopolitical differences in responses. Risk 
and patience preferences include three variables: risk tolerance, patience, and their 
interaction. For the variables in the other concerns, with 587 observations, 24 survey 
questions are factored into 8 variables: Health & Environment Safety Concern, Ease of 
Use Concern, Yield & Yield Loss Concern, Prices & Costs Concern, Weed Mobility 
Concern, Neighbor Resistance Concern, and Pessimistic and Optimistic Weed Resistance 
Attitudes. 
2.3.3 Analysis Methods 
The use of alternative weed management practices was reported on acreage proportion 
intervals.  In such cases, interval regression is the most appropriate method of analysis.  
Interval regression defines a latent variable that when combined with predefined intervals 
determine an individual’s response:  
𝑦𝑖
𝑡 =
{
  
 
  
 
1  for  0.0 ≥ 𝐱𝑖𝛌
𝑡 + 𝜏𝑖
𝑡
2  for  0.2 > 𝐱𝑖𝛌
𝑡 + 𝜏𝑖
𝑡 > 0.0
3  for  0.4 > 𝐱𝑖𝛌
𝑡 + 𝜏𝑖
𝑡 ≥ 0.2
4  for  0.6 > 𝐱𝑖𝛌
𝑡 + 𝜏𝑖
𝑡 ≥ 0.4
5  for  0.8 > 𝐱𝑖𝛌
𝑡 + 𝜏𝑖
𝑡 ≥ 0.6
6  for              𝐱𝑖𝛌
𝑡 + 𝜏𝑖
𝑡 ≥ 0.8
, 
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where 𝑦𝑖
𝑡 is the ith farmer’s response for tactic t, xi is a vector of farmer specific controls, 
𝛌𝑡 is a conformable parameter vector for weed management tactic t, and (𝜏𝑖
1, … , 𝜏𝑖
16)is a 
vector of errors  with a multivariate 161 mean vector of zeros and 1616 covariance 
matrix . Additional specifications including linear, and ordered probit models are also 
explored to assess the robustness of our results (see Appendix B). 
The reduced-form regression equations are jointly estimated using simulated 
maximum likelihood under the assumption of multivariate normality (Roodman 2011).
7
  
This analysis is analogous to a seemingly unrelated regression for limited dependent 
variables.  Therefore, the output includes an estimate of the correlation in the unexplained 
errors. The estimated correlation in the unexplained errors is further analyzed using factor 
analysis.
8
  The parallel analysis paradigm identified nine statistically significant factors 
with a 10% critical value.  Factor loadings are rotated with both normalized varimax and 
normalized oblique quartimin options.  Allowing for factor correlation, the quartimin 
rotation produces the easiest to interpret and most intuitive results.  This analysis 
provides additional insight into which sets of practices tend to be used in bundles by 
farmers, as well as which bundles tend to be used together. 
Farmer responses represent an interval that is bounded between zero and one for each 
of the sixteen management practices.  Therefore, we adapt the methods outlined in 
Krinsky and Robb (1986) to obtain estimates of the sample average proportion of a 
farmer’s land managed with each tactic, total number of tactics used, total proportion of 
treatment acres (e.g., the sum of the proportions of all tactics used by a farmer), and a 
                                                 
7  The analysis was performed with the user written cmp (conditional mixed process model) 
command in Stata. 
8
 This was accomplished using Stata’s factormat command. 
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Herfindahl index for the average share of treatment acres with each tactic.  Estimates of 
the sample average of the total tactics used, total proportion of treatments acres, and 
Herfindahl index provide related, but distinct, indicators of the diversity of weed 
management tactics used by farmers. The total number of tactics used provides a rough 
summary of the diversity of a farmer’s weed management. It is rough because a farmer 
could be using one main tactic on almost all crop acreage, and then a lot of other tactics 
on a much more limited number of crop acres, which is not really very diverse. The 
treatment acres help to determine if this is in fact the case.  If the total number of tactics 
used by a farmer is high, but the treatment acres are low, then a farmer is using a lot of 
different tactics each on a small proportion of the total crop acres.  In the extreme, if all 
the tactics a farmer uses are used on all crop acres, then the treatment acres will equal the 
total number of tactics.  The Herfindahl index provides a single measure of diversity that 
is scaled between zero and 100.  Approaching zero implies that all the tactics being used 
by the farmer are being used equally across the crop acres.  Alternatively, the Herfindahl 
index will approach 100 if a farmer moves toward using a single tactic for all weed 
management.  These estimates are used to assess our hypotheses, while estimates of the 
proportion of a farmer’s acres treated with each practice are used to gain additional 
insight into the sources of more or less diversity. 
Specifically, to estimate the proportion of acres treated with a particular practice, let  
?̂? and ?̂?  be the vector of all parameter estimates (including the error correlation estimates) 
and their covariance matrix obtained from the simulated maximum likelihood results. Let 
𝐓 be the set of weed management tactics.  First, we create 1,000 replications of random 
vectors with mean ?̂? and covariance ?̂?: ?̂?𝑟 = ?̂? + 𝐋?̂?𝛈𝑟 where 𝐋?̂? is the lower triangular 
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matrix of a Cholesky decomposition of ?̂?  and 𝛈𝑟  is a conformable vector of 
independently distributed standard normal random variables.  Then, for each replication, 
we predict the proportion of treated acres for each management tactic and each surveyed 
farm: 
?̂?𝑖,𝑟
𝑡 (𝐱𝑖) = {
1 for 𝐱𝑖?̂?𝑟
𝑡 + ?̂?𝑖,𝑟
𝑡 ≥ 1
0 for 𝐱𝑖?̂?𝑟
𝑡 + ?̂?𝑖,𝑟
𝑡 ≤ 0
𝐱𝑖?̂?𝑟
𝑡 + 𝜀?̂?,𝑟
𝑡 otherwise
   for 𝑡 ∈ 𝐓 and i = 1,…, N. 
 
In the above equation, the error ?̂?𝑖,𝑟
𝑡  is potentially correlated across the management 
practices, which is determined by the maximum likelihood correlation parameters 
reported in ?̂? and the same Cholesky decomposition method.  The number of practices 
adopted by a farmer is calculated as ?̂?𝑖,𝑟(𝐱𝑖) = ∑ 𝐼(?̂?𝑖,𝑟
𝑡 (𝐱𝑖) > 0)𝑡∈𝐓  where 𝐼(∙) is the 
indicator function.  The proportion of treatment acres is ?̂?𝑖,𝑟(𝐱𝑖) = ∑ ?̂?𝑖,𝑟
𝑡 (𝐱𝑖)𝑡∈𝐓 , while 
the Herfindahl index is ℎ̂𝑖,𝑟(𝐱𝑖) = 100
∑ ?̂?𝑖,𝑟
𝑡 (𝐱𝑖)
2
𝑡∈𝐓
(∑ ?̂?𝑖,𝑟
𝑡 (𝐱𝑖)𝑡∈𝐓 )
2.  Averaging over all farmers, then 
produces a distribution of sample averages: ?̂?𝑟
𝑡 = ∑
1
𝑁
?̂?𝑖,𝑟
𝑡 (𝐱𝑖)
𝑁
𝑖=1  for 𝑡 ∈ 𝐓 , ?̂?𝑟 =
∑
1
𝑁
?̂?𝑖,𝑟(𝐱𝑖)
𝑁
𝑖=1 , ?̂?𝑟 = ∑
1
𝑁
?̂?𝑖,𝑟(𝐱𝑖)
𝑁
𝑖=1 , and ℎ̂𝑟 = ∑
1
𝑁
ℎ̂𝑖,𝑟(𝐱𝑖)
𝑁
𝑖=1  for r = 1,…, 1,000.   
To calculate how sensitive these estimates are to the controls variables, for each, we 
estimate the average difference when it is increased by one-standard deviation: ∆?̂?𝑟
𝑡 =
∑
1
𝑁
(?̂?𝑖,𝑟
𝑡 (𝐱𝑖
𝑓) − ?̂?𝑖,𝑟
𝑡 (𝐱𝑖))
𝑁
𝑖=1  for 𝑡 ∈ 𝐓 , ∆?̂?𝑟 = ∑
1
𝑁
(?̂?𝑖,𝑟(𝐱𝑖
𝑓) − ?̂?𝑖,𝑟(𝐱𝑖))
𝑁
𝑖=1 , ∆?̂?𝑟 =
∑
1
𝑁
(?̂?𝑖,𝑟(𝐱𝑖
𝑓) − ?̂?𝑖,𝑟(𝐱𝑖))
𝑁
𝑖=1 , and ∆ℎ̂𝑟 = ∑
1
𝑁
(ℎ̂𝑖,𝑟(𝐱𝑖
𝑓) − ℎ̂𝑖,𝑟(𝐱𝑖))
𝑁
𝑖=1  for r = 1,…, 
1,000 where 𝐱𝑖
𝑓 is the vector of observed control variables for the ith surveyed farm with 
the fth variable in the vector increased by one standard deviation based on the survey 
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sample.  These distributions of differences are used to calculate the mean difference and 
construct 90 percent confidence intervals for evaluating Hypotheses I – IV. 
2.4 Regression Results and Discussion 
We begin discussion of our results with the interval regression mean parameter estimates. 
We then turn to the error correlation and standard deviation estimates, while including a 
discussion of our factor analysis of these results.  Finally, we discuss the estimated 
average use of alternative tactics including the total number of tactics, treatment acres 
and the Herfindahl index, and how these estimated averages change in response to a one 
standard deviation increase in selected control variables. 
2.4.1 Interval Regression Results 
Table 2.10 reports the mean coefficients with t-statistics in parentheses.  It also reports 
joint tests of the significance of the risk tolerance and patience, weed management 
concerns, weed mobility and neighbor resistance concerns, and optimistic and pessimistic 
weed resistance attitudes. These mean coefficients can be interpreted qualitatively, but 
will not represent true marginal effects due to the bounded proportions nature of the 
response data. 
The total number of crop acres is positively and significantly associated with a 
farmer’s use of mulches and cover crops; pre-emergent, post-emergent, and post-harvest 
herbicides; herbicide mixes; multiple herbicides; and MOA rotation. Gender is only 
negatively and significantly associated with inter-row cultivation, though with few 
women in the sample, precise estimates were not expected.  Education is negatively and 
significantly associated with the use of planting date changes, and pre- and post-emergent 
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herbicide applications.  It is significantly and positively associated with the use of weed 
maps.  Increased farming experience is negatively associated with most management 
tactics, significantly so for the use of tillage, hand weeding, pre- and post-emergent 
herbicide applications, herbicide mixes and multiple herbicides.  Exceptions include a 
significant positive association with the use of narrow row planting and weed maps. 
Risk tolerances and patience are jointly significant for the use of hand-weeding, 
mulches and cover crops, herbicide mixes and multiple herbicides.  The significance of 
these associations is not as evident in the t-statistics for the individual mean coefficients 
due to strong correlation between risk tolerance, patience, and their interaction. 
Jointly, weed management concerns are significantly associated with the use of hand 
weeding, narrow row planting, full label rates and rotation of MOA.  While these joint 
results do not appear strong, there is a notable significant negative association between 
ease of use concern and the use of multiple herbicides, full label rates, and MOA rotation, 
and notable significant positive association between yield and yield loss concern, and use 
of hand weeding, crop rotation, planting densities, narrow row planting, and pre-
emergent herbicides.   
There is a joint significance of weed mobility and neighbor resistant weed concern 
with the use of a range of tactics: hand weeding, planting dates, use of weed maps, post-
harvest herbicides, herbicide mixes, multiple herbicides, use of full label rates, and MOA 
rotation.  Looking at the individual t-statistics reveals these significant effects reflect 
positive associations with the use of a range of different tactics.   
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Jointly, optimistic and pessimistic weed resistance attitudes are significantly 
associated with the use of post-emergent herbicides and full label rates.  Regardless of 
whether these attitudes are optimistic or pessimistic, the significant associations are all 
negative.  Notable in these results is that most of the significant associations are with 
optimistic attitudes: use of post-emergent herbicides, multiple herbicides, full label rates, 
and MOA rotation. 
Table 2.11 reports the estimated correlation of errors and the estimated error standard 
deviations.  The likelihood ratio test for the null hypothesis that the correlations are 
jointly zero is soundly rejected (2(120) = 893.64).  The strongest pairwise correlations 
are between the use of herbicide mixes and multiple herbicides (0.714), and tillage and 
inter-row cultivation (0.433).  These results are not surprising because the use of mixed 
herbicides implies multiple herbicides, and inter-row cultivation implies tillage.  
Similarly, rotating crops often necessitates rotating herbicide mechanism of action 
because the types of suitable herbicides for one crop can be deadly to another. The factor 
analysis loadings reported in the top of Table 2.12 supports these obvious pairwise 
relationships, as well as the less obvious two-way correlation between hand weeding and 
pre-emergent herbicide use, and three-way correlation between the use of weed maps, 
planting narrow rows, and increased planting densities.   
The correlation in the factors reported in the bottom of Table 2.12 further suggests 
that herbicide mixes, multiple herbicides, MOA rotation, crop rotation, use of full labeled 
rates, post-harvest herbicides are often used in tandem, as are weed maps, narrow rows, 
increased planting densities, and changes to planting dates.  A strong positive correlation 
suggests post-emergent herbicides are often used in tandem with mulches and cover crops 
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or changes too planting dates. Relatively strong negative correlations suggest tillage and 
inter-row cultivation substitute for herbicide mixes and multiple herbicides, while 
mulches and cover crops serve to substitute for the use of post-harvest herbicides applied 
at the full labeled rate. 
2.4.2 Marginal Effects 
Marginal effects were estimated based on a one standard deviation increase in the 
variables of interest.  Due to the bounded nature of the response data, these marginal 
effects were computed for each individual observation and then aggregated. Figure 2.3– 
Figure 2.7 reports these estimates.  In these figures, estimates of the average proportion 
of acreage managed with a tactic are reported in parentheses on the horizontal axis 
following the tactic labels.  For example, in Figure 2.3, the most widely used tactic to 
manage weeds is post-emergent herbicides — 82% of total crop acres on average.  The 
next most widely used tactics are not surprisingly also related to herbicide use: use of full 
label rates (76%), herbicide mixes (74%), multiple herbicides (73%), and pre-emergent 
herbicides (72%).  The least common tactic is weed maps (9%), followed by inter-row 
cultivation (13%), mulches and cover crops (15%), hand weeding (17%), planting date 
changes (19%), and increased planting densities (25%).  On about half of all crop 
acreages on average, weeds are managed using MOA rotation (57%), tillage (46%), and 
narrow row plantings (43%). Finally, on about three out of every four acres (72%) on 
average, weeds are also managed using crop rotation.  Estimates of the average of total 
tactics used by a farmer, treatment acres, and the Herfindahl index are similarly reported.  
On average, a farmer used 10.7 different weed management tactics with each acre being 
managed with 7.15 different tactics, and a Herfindahl index of 12.0.  These summary 
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statistics are included on each panel of the Figure 2.3–Figure 2.7 to help judge the 
relative magnitude of the changes reported in the figure. 
The change in the use of different weed management tactics and measure of the 
diversity of weed management are differentiated for each selected control variable using 
different symbols and different colors.  Additionally, solid colored symbols are used to 
indicate that the estimated effect is significantly different from zero based on 90% 
confidence intervals.  For example, in Figure 2.3, a one-standard deviation increase in a 
farm’s crop acres is associated with a significant and positive increase in the proportion 
of the farm’s acres managed using mulches and cover crops.  Alternatively, a one-
standard deviation increase in a farmer’s years of education is associated with a small and 
insignificant decrease in the use of mulches and cover crops, while a one-standard 
deviation increase in the number of years a farmer has farmed appears to have no 
association with a farmer’s use of mulches and cover crops.  Looking at results for the 
Herfindal index, shows crop acres have a significant negative association indicating 
greater diversity of management tactics with increased farm size. Years of education and 
farming are positively associated with the Herfindahl index, significantly so for years 
farming, which suggest older and more experienced farmers tend to use less diverse weed 
management tactics. 
Overall, the results in Figure 2.3, suggest larger farms are more reliant on herbicides 
for weed management, but are also using a more diverse set of herbicide management 
tactics.  Alternatively, older farmers are less reliant on herbicides, tillage, hand weeding, 
and crop rotation, but more reliant on planting narrow rows and weed maps.  While these 
older farmers use significantly less diverse tactics on the acreage they manage, they also 
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have fewer treatment acres, suggesting that they are willing to accept a modicum of weed 
pressure in their crop relative to their less experienced counterparts.  More educated 
farmers also appear significantly less reliant on pre- and post-emergent herbicides and the 
use of planting dates to manage weeds, but are more reliant on the use of weed maps, 
suggesting they may be using these weed maps to apply herbicides more selectively. 
Figure 2.4 shows how farmer’s reported risk tolerance and patience relate to 
alternative weed management tactics, providing insight into Hypothesis I. The results 
indicate farmers who say they are more prepared to take risks report significantly more 
use of pre- and post-emergent herbicides, herbicide mixes, and multiple herbicides.  This 
yields a significantly higher number of tactics and treatment acres, and a smaller 
Herfindahl index — all signs of greater weed management diversity, though this diversity 
is more reliant on herbicides.  The association between a farmer’s reported level of 
patience and various weed management tactics is weak, with only a significant, small, 
and positive association with hand weeding. Combined, these results suggest farmer’s 
weed management decisions are myopic, such that the future benefits of managing 
herbicide resistance is not a high priority. If this is indeed the case, the relationship 
between more risk tolerant farmers and more intensive weed management is likely driven 
by contemporary production and marketing risks, rather than the future risk of herbicide 
resistant weeds. 
Weed mobility and neighbor resistance concerns are associated with significantly 
more treatment acres and more diverse weed management (Figure 2.5).  Weed mobility 
concerns are also significantly associated with the use of more weed management tactics.  
Neither result supports Hypothesis III.  More specifically, farmers who are concerned 
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about resistant weeds coming from other regions and counties as well as more local 
neighbors report greater use of hand weeding, crop rotation, increased planting densities, 
different planting dates, weeds maps, post-harvest herbicides, herbicide mixes, and 
multiple herbicides. Farmers with concerns about more local mobility, but not from other 
counties or regions report greater use of pre-emergent herbicides, herbicide mixes, 
multiple herbicides, use of full label rates, and MOA rotation. Recall that a farmer’s 
reported level of patience has little significant association with the use of alternative 
weed management tactics, a result that suggests myopic behavior and less concern for the 
future benefits of managing herbicide resistance. Therefore, the positive association 
between weed mobility and the use of more and more diverse management tactics is 
likely attributable to an increase in the marginal productivity of weed management when 
there is increased weed pressure and potential damage coming from weed immigration.  
Farmers who express greater concern about protecting yields and having consistent 
yields (e.g., yield and yield loss concern) also report more and more diverse weed 
management tactics in support Hypothesis IV c) (Figure 2.6).  These more and more 
diverse tactics include significantly greater use of hand weeding, crop rotation, increased 
planting densities, narrow row planting, pre-emergent herbicides, and MOA rotation.  
While ease of use concern is significantly and negatively associated with the use of post-
emergent herbicides, multiple herbicides, full label rates, and mechanism of action 
rotation, this less diligent weed management is not associated with significantly fewer 
and less diverse weed management tactics, which provides only limited support for 
Hypothesis IV a).  Even though human and environmental safety concern is significantly 
and positively associated with planting narrow rows, and prices and costs concern is 
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significantly and positively associated with the use of full label rates, more general 
support for Hypothesis IV b) and c) is not apparent. 
General support for a negative effect of optimistic and pessimistic weed resistance 
attitudes on the number and diversity of weed management tactics is not apparent in 
Figure 2.7.  Still, there is evidence that optimistic attitudes are significantly and 
negatively associated with the use of post-emergent herbicides, multiple herbicides, full 
label rates, and MOA rotation.  Alternatively, more pessimistic attitudes are significantly 
associated with less weed map and post-emergent herbicide use. Therefore, the support 
for Hypothesis II a) and b) is also limited. 
2.5 Discussion and Conclusion 
This study explored the degree to which a variety of economic and behavioral factors 
relate to a farmer’s use of a wide range of chemical, mechanical and cultural weed best 
management tactics and the diversity of use of these tactics by predominantly corn, 
cotton, soybean and wheat farmers. We evaluate the consistency of these relations with 
common explanations for why farmers do not adopt more varied weed management 
tactics in order to reduce the risk of herbicide resistant weeds.  Interestingly, two of the 
most common arguments for why farmers are not more willing to use a diversity of weed 
management tactics are not well supported by our data and analysis. 
Miranowski and Carlson’s (1986) identification of pest mobility as a key factor in 
determining whether farmers will effectively manage pesticide resistance on their own 
continues to be one of the key explanations for why farmer adoption of herbicide resistant 
weed management tactics remains low.  In particular, Miranowski and Carlson argue that 
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if farmers are concerned about weed mobility, they will not do enough to manage 
herbicide resistance because this mobility makes an herbicide susceptible weed 
population a common property resource that is subject to the “tragedy of the commons.”  
Contrary to this argument, we find that farmers who are more concerned about weed 
mobility use a wider variety of weed management tactics that can help reduce the risk of 
herbicide resistance. This is particularly true for farmers who are more concerned about 
long range movement from other counties or regions.  While this result is not consistent 
with Miranowski and Carlson’s argument, it is consistent with the results obtained from 
theoretical approach in Section 2. After correctly assessing the neighbor’s strategy and 
field condition, farmers are rational and likely to work harder to control weeds when they 
know they have more weeds to contend with due to spill overs from neighbors’ fields. 
That is, sustainable weed management is a joint resource management problem where 
farmers must manage weeds currently in the field that could result in contemporary crop 
losses and work collectively with other farmers to contribute to the weed seed bank (e.g., 
the seeds in the soil that germinate and produce future weed infestations), and the 
susceptibility of weeds. While such a result does not negate “tragedy of the commons” 
concerns from a community perspective, it does suggest that the potential for tragedy can 
be even greater when farmers are not concerned about spillovers from neighbors’ fields. 
Farmers who are more risk tolerant use more diverse weed management tactics, 
which is consistent with the argument that more risk averse farmers do less resistance 
management because the costs are immediate and certain, but the benefits come later and 
are uncertain.  However, such an argument also relies on the assumption that less patient 
farmers do less herbicide resistance management, which is not well supported by our 
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analysis.  There are several potential explanations for the observed importance of risk 
tolerance, but not patience.  First, risk tolerance and patience are highly correlated, so the 
analysis may not be measuring the importance of patience very precisely.  Alternatively, 
a classic paper by Sandmo in 1971 argued more risk tolerant firms would produce more 
requiring more inputs when revenues are uncertain, which is consistent with our result.  
Alternatively, Just and Pope (1979), argues that management tactics can be risk 
increasing or risk decreasing.  Risk increasing tactics will be used more and risk 
decreasing tactics will be used less by more risk tolerant farmers, making the direction of 
any potential effect an empirical question.  If the primary explanation for our observed 
result is that more risk tolerant farmers are using a broader range of management tactics 
to improve contemporary weed control, then programs that reduce farmer production and 
marketing risk, like federal crop insurance programs, can provide less risk tolerant 
farmers with an incentive to do more to manage herbicide resistance. 
Three additional results worth reiterating are larger farms are using a greater diversity 
of weed management tactics, older and more experienced farmers are managing fewer 
crop acres for weeds and using less diverse tactics, and optimistic farmers are more 
reliant on higher risk herbicide based management tactics. The first of these results is 
different from previous studies which found that number of acres operated had 
significantly negative association with the use of resistant weed management, but with 
quite small impact (Dong, Mitchell, Hurley and Frisvold, 2016). Since our sample, 
though weighted toward larger farms to begin with, has around 14% of respondents with 
farms below 250 acres, this result suggests that more intermediate sized farms are using 
less diverse weed management tactics, which raises several additional questions. Are 
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these intermediate sized farms relying on off-farm income, which leaves them little 
additional time to devote to more diverse and intensive weed management? Are these 
intermediate sized farms not receiving the same information as larger farms?  To better 
understand what types of strategies can be used to improve adoption of more diverse 
weed management tactics by these farms, additional research is needed to answer these 
questions. 
Consistent with the result found by Frisvold, Hurley and Mitchell (2009), the use of 
less diverse weed management tactics by more experienced farmers points to a 
potentially troublesome life cycle effect.  To the extent that these more experienced 
farmers are nearing retirement and have no way to monetize the future value of their 
resistant management efforts, they have little incentive to use more diverse weed 
management tactics.  With increasing interest and capacity for more data intensive 
farming, the ability of farmers to accurately document and ultimately monetize their 
stewardship efforts, including herbicide resistant management efforts, without 
extraordinary cost will soon be possible.  How soon is an important policy target for both 
government and industry leaders to consider. 
Farmers who are optimistic about potential solutions to herbicide resistance problems 
are less likely to use post-emergent herbicides, multiple herbicides, full label rates and 
mechanism of action rotation—tactics that are arguably the easiest to implement within 
current herbicide reliant production regimes.  A question this raises is whether providing 
these farmers with accurate and compelling information on the challenges of identifying 
and bringing new herbicides to market can suitably temper their optimism?  The answer 
41 
 
to this question is a key to understanding if the benefits of such educational programs are 
worth the expense. 
Overall, the results do not point to one singular mechanism that is primarily 
responsible for the low adoption of the diverse weed management tactics that could 
reduce the risk of herbicide resistance.  Instead, we find that there are a lot of different 
mechanisms that are contributing to low adoption.  With that said, we also find some 
unexpected positive signs for greater adoption of more diverse weed management among 
larger farms, famers who are concerned about yield losses and consistent yields, and 
among farmers who are concerned about weed mobility. And our results for education 
and concerns about human and environmental health are not as significant as found by 
previous work (Frisvold, Hurley and Mitchell, 2009; Dong, Mitchell, Hurley and 
Frisvold, 2016). Regardless, attempts to promote further adoption of more diverse weed 
management will require a multifaceted approach to be successful.  
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Table 2.1 Summary of Model Implication for Hypothesis III 
𝜕2𝑝𝑖(𝑒𝑖, 𝑒𝑗  𝜓𝑖)
𝜕𝑒𝑖𝜕𝑒𝑗
 
𝜕2𝑝𝑗(𝑒𝑖 , 𝑒𝑗 𝜓𝑖)
𝜕𝑒𝑗𝜕𝑒𝑖
 
𝑑𝑒𝑖
𝑑𝛼𝑖
|
𝛼𝑖=1
 
Implication 
+ + ambiguous 
When farmer 𝑖  and neighboring farmers’ 
efforts are mutual strategic substitutes or 
complements, the increasing effectiveness of 
neighbors’ efforts may improve farmer i’s 
cooperation or exacerbate farmer i’s free-
riding. 
− − ambiguous 
+ − < 0 
When the neighboring farmers’ efforts are a 
strategic substitute for farmer i and farmer 
i’s effort is a strategic complement for 
neighboring farmers, the increasing 
effectiveness of neighbors’ efforts 
exacerbates farmer i’s free-riding. 
− + > 0 
When the neighboring farmers’ efforts are a 
strategic complement for farmer i and farmer 
i’s effort is a strategic substitute for 
neighboring farmers’ efforts, the increasing 
effectiveness of neighbors’ efforts improves 
farmer i’s cooperation. 
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Table 2.2 Geographic Characteristics 
 
Survey   
USDA Census of 
Agriculture, 2012 
       
% of Total Acres of 
Cropland used for 
Crops* 
State 
Farm 
No. % 
 
Acre % 
 
Survey 
States 
 
United 
States 
                  
Arkansas 39 6.64% 
 
65932 8.20% 
 
2.52% 
 
2.04% 
Alabama 5 0.85% 
 
4730 0.59% 
 
0.88% 
 
0.71% 
Arizona 4 0.68% 
 
9270 1.15% 
 
0.37% 
 
0.30% 
Delaware 2 0.34% 
 
4150 0.52% 
 
0.14% 
 
0.11% 
Georgia 3 0.51% 
 
2430 0.30% 
 
1.33% 
 
1.08% 
Illinois 44 7.50% 
 
43267 5.38% 
 
7.54% 
 
6.10% 
Indiana 18 3.07% 
 
18983 2.36% 
 
3.99% 
 
3.23% 
Iowa 40 6.81% 
 
34224 4.26% 
 
8.33% 
 
6.74% 
Kansas 34 5.79% 
 
58639 7.30% 
 
9.04% 
 
7.31% 
Kentucky 16 2.73% 
 
22744 2.83% 
 
2.01% 
 
1.63% 
Louisiana 23 3.92% 
 
43422 5.40% 
 
1.36% 
 
1.10% 
Maryland 8 1.36% 
 
14651 1.82% 
 
0.44% 
 
0.36% 
Michigan 19 3.24% 
 
26878 3.34% 
 
2.43% 
 
1.97% 
Minnesota 34 5.79% 
 
27358 3.40% 
 
6.85% 
 
5.54% 
Mississippi 31 5.28% 
 
56102 6.98% 
 
1.61% 
 
1.30% 
Missouri 10 1.70% 
 
15110 1.88% 
 
4.84% 
 
3.92% 
Nebraska 46 7.84% 
 
51369 6.39% 
 
6.85% 
 
5.54% 
New Mexico 1 0.17% 
 
2250 0.28% 
 
0.63% 
 
0.51% 
North Carolina 27 4.60% 
 
22546 2.80% 
 
1.51% 
 
1.22% 
North Dakota 21 3.58% 
 
42182 5.25% 
 
8.61% 
 
6.97% 
Ohio 29 4.94% 
 
17630 2.19% 
 
3.41% 
 
2.76% 
Oklahoma 16 2.73% 
 
25330 3.15% 
 
3.58% 
 
2.89% 
South Carolina 9 1.53% 
 
6835 0.85% 
 
0.62% 
 
0.50% 
South Dakota 22 3.75% 
 
41330 5.14% 
 
6.08% 
 
4.91% 
Tennessee 17 2.90% 
 
31650 3.94% 
 
1.69% 
 
1.37% 
Texas 39 6.64% 
 
90118 11.21% 
 
9.25% 
 
7.48% 
Virginia 9 1.53% 
 
7593 0.94% 
 
0.95% 
 
0.77% 
Wisconsin 21 3.58% 17083 2.13% 3.14% 2.54% 
  
         Total 587    803806    100%   80.88% 
* Cropland used for crops includes cropland harvested, crop failure, and summer fallow. 
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Table 2.3 Data Description 
Panel A. Farms by Size 
Farms by size (%) Survey 
Surveyed States;  
USDA Census of Agriculture, 2012 
  
Total Farm 
Acres
1
 
Total Harvested Cropland 
Acres
2
 
1 to 9 acres 0.17 7.13 13.95 
10 to 49 acres 0.85 26.75 35.11 
50 to 179 acres 8.18 32.32 31.79 
180 to 499 acres 20.1 18.20 21.64 
 500 to 999 acres 23.85 7.43 6.91 
1,000 acres or more 46.85 8.17 7.30 
1
Total land is the sum of cropland, pasture/range, forest-use land, special uses, urban 
area and other land.
 
2
Cropland harvested is one of the three components of cropland used for crops.  
 
Panel B. Distribution by Socio-Economic Variables 
  Sample 
Gender(%) 
 Men 99.06 
Women 0.94 
  Farming year (%) 
 3-25 years 20.78 
26-35 years 26.92 
36-45 years 35.26 
46-55 years 13.29 
55-65 years 2.9 
66-86 years 0.85 
  Household income (%) 
 Less than $15k 0.34 
$15k to $25k 2.39 
$25k to $50k 9.71 
$50k to $100k 31.69 
$100k to $250k 31.18 
$250k to $500k 11.58 
$500k or more 8.01 
  Major source of household income (%) 
 farming operation 66.61 
off-farm sources 18.57 
equal between above options 14.82 
  Farming operation certified organic (%) 
 Entire 0 
Part, but not all 1.02 
Use organic methods, but not certified organic 1.87 
None 96.25 
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Table 2.4 Distribution of Control Techniques Responses 
  1 2 3 4 5 6  
    Did-not-use <20% 20-39% 40-59% 60-79% 80-100% non response 
a
 
Cultural 
Tactics 
Crop Rotation 4.4% 2.4% 5.3% 14.1% 16.7% 54.5% 2.6% 
High Seeding Rates/Plant Densities 44.5% 10.6% 10.2% 11.9% 8.9% 9.0% 4.9% 
Choice Planting Date to Reduce 
Weed Competition 
57.6% 10.9% 6.8% 9.9% 6.1% 7.2% 1.5% 
Narrow Rows 36.1% 2.6% 5.6% 14.3% 13.3% 27.3% 0.9% 
Weed Maps 81.3% 4.9% 3.6% 3.1% 2.2% 3.4% 1.5% 
Mechanical 
Tactics 
Inter Row Cultivation 74.4% 8.0% 3.2% 3.7% 2.7% 3.6% 4.3% 
Tillage 23.0% 10.4% 9.5% 14.1% 13.3% 26.7% 2.9% 
Hand Weeding 39.4% 36.3% 8.2% 6.3% 3.4% 4.9% 1.5% 
Planted Cover Crop/ Used Mulches 60.0% 14.8% 7.0% 7.2% 3.4% 5.5% 2.2% 
Chemical 
Tactics 
Pre-Emergent Herbicide 7.8% 3.7% 4.3% 12.1% 13.8% 56.7% 1.5% 
Post-Emergent Herbicide 2.4% 1.4% 2.6% 9.5% 14.5% 67.8% 1.9% 
Post-Harvest Herbicide 49.7% 11.6% 7.0% 10.6% 5.6% 8.3% 7.2% 
Herbicide 
Application 
Methods 
Herbicide Mixes 4.3% 1.7% 5.3% 10.1% 26.9% 49.7% 2.0% 
Multiple Herbicides 3.2% 3.1% 3.4% 11.8% 23.0% 52.8% 2.7% 
Use Full Label Herbicide Rate 2.2% 2.9% 4.3% 10.2% 20.3% 57.8% 2.4% 
Rotating Herbicide Modes of Action 
Annually 
13.1% 5.1% 7.0% 19.3% 20.3% 33.2% 2.0% 
a.
 We assumed that the explanation for missing values of application rates relates directly to the missing values. That is to say, farmers may only provide  
the application rates for the control techniques they are using, and fail to offer a completed application rate rating. The value of the missing variable is 
directly related to the value of that variable --- farmers not using the control techniques (0% ratings for application rates) may be more likely to be  
missing a value for application rate. Therefore, we replace the missing values in application rates with values of “Did-not-use”. 
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Table 2.4 (continued) Distribution of Control Techniques Responses 
  Farms with Acre>250 
    Did-not-use <20% 20-39% 40-59% 60-79% 80-100% non response 
a
 
Cultural 
Tactics 
Crop Rotation 75.4% 8.1% 3.2% 3.8% 2.8% 3.2% 3.6% 
High Seeding Rates/Plant Densities 22.4% 11.1% 9.1% 14.9% 13.9% 26.6% 2.0% 
Choice Planting Date to Reduce 
Weed Competition 
4.0% 2.6% 4.8% 14.1% 16.7% 55.8% 2.2% 
Narrow Rows 6.3% 4.0% 4.4% 11.5% 13.3% 59.1% 1.4% 
Weed Maps 2.2% 1.6% 2.2% 9.1% 13.9% 69.0% 2.0% 
Mechanical 
Tactics 
Inter Row Cultivation 48.6% 12.1% 7.9% 10.9% 6.0% 8.3% 6.2% 
Tillage 44.2% 11.5% 10.5% 12.1% 8.9% 7.9% 4.8% 
Hand Weeding 3.4% 1.4% 5.4% 9.5% 27.4% 51.0% 2.0% 
Planted Cover Crop/ Used Mulches 2.8% 3.0% 2.8% 12.1% 23.0% 53.8% 2.6% 
Chemical 
Tactics 
Pre-Emergent Herbicide 38.9% 38.1% 7.7% 6.3% 3.2% 4.6% 1.2% 
Post-Emergent Herbicide 2.2% 2.6% 3.6% 9.7% 21.2% 58.3% 2.4% 
Post-Harvest Herbicide 59.9% 16.3% 7.3% 6.9% 3.2% 4.8% 1.6% 
Herbicide 
Application 
Methods 
Herbicide Mixes 57.3% 11.3% 7.3% 9.9% 6.2% 6.3% 1.6% 
Multiple Herbicides 10.7% 4.8% 6.7% 19.4% 22.2% 34.3% 1.8% 
Use Full Label Herbicide Rate 36.1% 3.0% 6.0% 14.9% 12.9% 26.2% 1.0% 
Rotating Herbicide Modes of Action 
Annually 
80.2% 5.6% 3.4% 3.6% 2.4% 3.4% 1.6% 
a.
 We assumed that the explanation for missing values of application rates relates directly to the missing values. That is to say, farmers may only provide  
the application rates for the control techniques they are using, and fail to offer a completed application rate rating. The value of the missing variable is 
directly related to the value of that variable --- farmers not using the control techniques (0% ratings for application rates) may be more likely to be  
missing a value for application rate. Therefore, we replace the missing values in application rates with values of “Did-not-use”. 
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Table 2.4 (continued) Distribution of Control Techniques Responses 
  Farms with Acre<=250 
    Did-not-use <20% 20-39% 40-59% 60-79% 80-100% non response 
a
 
Cultural 
Tactics 
Crop Rotation 68.7% 7.2% 3.6% 3.6% 2.4% 6.0% 8.4% 
High Seeding Rates/Plant Densities 26.5% 6.0% 12.0% 9.6% 9.6% 27.7% 8.4% 
Choice Planting Date to Reduce 
Weed Competition 
7.2% 1.2% 8.4% 14.5% 16.9% 47.0% 4.8% 
Narrow Rows 16.9% 2.4% 3.6% 15.7% 16.9% 42.2% 2.4% 
Weed Maps 3.6% 0.0% 4.8% 12.0% 18.1% 60.2% 1.2% 
Mechanical 
Tactics 
Inter Row Cultivation 56.6% 8.4% 1.2% 8.4% 3.6% 8.4% 13.3% 
Tillage 45.8% 4.8% 8.4% 10.8% 8.4% 15.7% 6.0% 
Hand Weeding 9.6% 3.6% 4.8% 13.3% 24.1% 42.2% 2.4% 
Planted Cover Crop/ Used Mulches 6.0% 3.6% 7.2% 9.6% 22.9% 47.0% 3.6% 
Chemical 
Tactics 
Pre-Emergent Herbicide 42.2% 25.3% 10.8% 6.0% 4.8% 7.2% 3.6% 
Post-Emergent Herbicide 2.4% 4.8% 8.4% 13.3% 14.5% 54.2% 2.4% 
Post-Harvest Herbicide 60.2% 6.0% 4.8% 8.4% 4.8% 9.6% 6.0% 
Herbicide 
Application 
Methods 
Herbicide Mixes 59.0% 8.4% 3.6% 9.6% 6.0% 12.0% 1.2% 
Multiple Herbicides 27.7% 7.2% 8.4% 18.1% 8.4% 26.5% 3.6% 
Use Full Label Herbicide Rate 36.1% 0.0% 3.6% 10.8% 15.7% 33.7% 0.0% 
Rotating Herbicide Modes of Action 
Annually 
88.0% 1.2% 4.8% 0.0% 1.2% 3.6% 1.2% 
a.
 We assumed that the explanation for missing values of application rates relates directly to the missing values. That is to say, farmers may only provide  
the application rates for the control techniques they are using, and fail to offer a completed application rate rating. The value of the missing variable is 
directly related to the value of that variable --- farmers not using the control techniques (0% ratings for application rates) may be more likely to be  
missing a value for application rate. Therefore, we replace the missing values in application rates with values of “Did-not-use”. 
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Table 2.5 Indicator Score Characteristics for Farmers’ Management Concerns 
Concern 
 
Average 
Standard 
Deviation 
Safety and Environmental Concerns 
   Worker safety 
 
4.34 0.94 
Protecting wildlife 
 
4.15 0.95 
Protecting water quality 
 
4.45 0.86 
Controlling soil erosion 
 
4.39 0.93 
    Flexibility & Convenience 
   Flexibility & convenience 
 
4.27 0.76 
Simplicity 
 
4.05 0.86 
Convenience 
 
4.03 0.89 
    Production Risk 
   Protecting yield 
 
4.86 0.48 
Having long lasting weed control 
 
4.70 0.58 
Having residual control 
 
4.52 0.71 
    Market Costs 
   Herbicide cost 
 
4.40 0.77 
Commodity price   4.47 0.81 
Response options: scale 1 (not important at all) to scale 5 (very 
important) 
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Table 2.6 Factors, Standardized Loadings and Uniqueness for Farmers’ Management 
Concerns 
Concern 
Human 
& 
Environ-
ment 
Safety 
Ease of 
Use 
Yield & 
Yield 
Loss 
Prices & 
Costs  Uniqueness 
Protecting water 
quality 
0.813 0.137 0.202 0.104   0.268 
Protecting wildlife 0.776 0.197 0.105 0.041   0.347 
Worker safety 0.641 0.336 0.108 0.103   0.454 
Controlling soil 
erosion 
0.634 0.040 0.155 0.271   0.499 
Simplicity 0.212 0.810 0.126 0.214   0.238 
Convenience 0.205 0.795 0.115 0.209   0.269 
Flexibility 0.158 0.560 0.411 0.089   0.486 
Having residual 
control 
0.090 0.161 0.707 0.119   0.453 
Having long lasting 
weed control 
0.168 0.123 0.686 0.122 
  
0.471 
Protecting yield 0.249 0.068 0.351 0.272   0.736 
Commodity price 0.211 0.106 0.237 0.558   0.578 
Herbicide cost 0.048 0.217 0.062 0.497   0.700 
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Table 2.7 Indicator Score Characteristics for Farmers’ Attitudes of Weed Resistance 
Statement 
 
Average 
Standard 
Deviation 
Weed Mobility Concerns 
   I am concerned about herbicide resistant weeds spreading to my farming operation from nearby farming operations. 
 
3.89 1.01 
I am concerned about herbicide resistant weeds spreading to my county from nearby counties. 
 
3.88 0.99 
I am concerned about herbicide resistant weeds spreading to my region of the U.S. from other regions. 
 
3.80 1.05 
Even if I keep my fields clean, I could get herbicide resistant weeds from neighboring farms. 
 
4.18 0.86 
    Local and Own Farm Resistance Concerns 
   I would be more concerned about herbicide resistance on my own land than on land that I rent. 
 
2.30 1.27 
    Pessimistic attitudes toward weed resistance 
   When new weed management technologies are introduced, it is only a matter of time before pests evolve resistance. 
 
4.00 0.80 
Modern agricultural practices contribute to the conditions that spur evolution of herbicide resistant weeds. 
 
3.73 1.02 
Any new chemical mode of action that is developed to control weeds will be overused.  
 
3.57 0.96 
    Optimistic Attitudes Toward Weed Resistance 
   Weed resistance can be managed effectively without cooperation amongst farmers in a community. 
 
2.37 1.13 
By the time a weed develops resistance to an herbicide, at least one new herbicide will have been found to replace it. 
 
2.39 1.02 
    Other items 
   Managing herbicide resistant weeds is as much an environmental issue as a farm management issue. 
 
3.72 0.99 
Seed and chemical companies should do a better job of keeping up with the evolution of resistance in weeds. 
 
3.60 0.93 
Response options: scale 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree)       
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Table 2.8 Factors, Standardized Loadings and Uniqueness for Farmers’ Attitudes of Weed Resistance 
Statement 
Weed Mobility 
Concern 
Neighbor Resistance 
Concern 
 
Uniqueness 
I am concerned about herbicide resistant weeds spreading to 
my county from nearby counties. 
0.887 -0.144 0.194 
I am concerned about herbicide resistant weeds spreading to 
my region of the U.S. from other regions. 
0.781 -0.233  0.336 
I am concerned about herbicide resistant weeds spreading to 
my farming operation from nearby farming operations. 
0.745 0.190  0.409 
Even if I keep my fields clean, I could get herbicide resistant 
weeds from neighboring farms. 
0.572 0.191  0.637 
I would be more concerned about herbicide resistance on my 
own land than on land that I rent. 
0.002 0.148  0.978 
     
Statement 
Pessimistic Weed 
Resistance Attitudes 
Optimistic Weed 
Resistance Attitudes 
 
Uniqueness 
Modern agricultural practices contribute to the conditions that 
spur evolution of herbicide resistant weeds. 
0.540 0.017 0.709 
Any new chemical mode of action that is developed to control 
weeds will be overused.  
0.491 -0.013  0.758 
When new weed management technologies are introduced, it is 
only a matter of time before pests evolve resistance. 
0.441 -0.156  0.782 
Managing herbicide resistant weeds is as much an 
environmental issue as a farm management issue. 
0.285 -0.198  0.880 
Seed and chemical companies should do a better job of keeping 
up with the evolution of resistance in weeds. 
0.233 0.042  0.944 
Weed resistance can be managed effectively without 
cooperation amongst farmers in a community. 
-0.036 0.447  0.799 
By the time a weed develops resistance to an herbicide, at least 
one new herbicide will have been found to replace it. 
0.014 0.413  0.830 
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Table 2.9 Control Variable Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Gender (Female = 1) 0.99 0.10 0.00 1.00 
Farming Experience (Years) 35.68 12.57 3.00 86.00 
Education (Years) 15.86 7.67 0.00 56.00 
Crop Acres (1,000) 1369.35 1434.57 3.00 9000.00 
Risk Tolerance 0.70 0.19 0.10 1.00 
Patience 0.62 0.22 0.10 1.00 
Human & Environment Safety Concern 0.00 0.89 -4.23 1.78 
Ease of Use Concern 0.00 0.88 -3.85 1.92 
Yield & Yield Loss Concern 0.00 0.80 -5.45 1.31 
Prices & Costs Concern 0.00 0.67 -4.37 1.64 
Weed Mobility Concern 0.00 0.93 -3.19 1.23 
Neighbor Resistance Concern 0.00 0.50 -2.55 2.56 
Pessimistic Weed Resistance Attitude 0.00 0.71 -2.66 1.59 
Optimistic Weed Resistance Attitude 0.00 0.57 -1.22 1.70 
Observations 587 
 
 
54 
 
Table 2.10 Weed Control Methods — Interval Regression Results — Mean Parameters 
Estimates.
a.b
 
Variable 
Inter-Row 
Cultivation Tillage 
Hand 
Weeding 
Mulches/ 
Cover 
Crops 
Crop Acres (1,000) -0.0215 0.0201 0.0039 0.0385** 
(0.73) (1.01) (0.34) (2.08) 
Gender (Female = 1) -1.274*** -0.189 -0.053 0.014 
(2.93) (0.68) (0.35) (0.05) 
Education (Years) 0.0017 -0.0046 0.0016 -0.0026 
(0.28) (1.16) (0.69) (0.64) 
Farming Experience (Years) -0.0007 -0.0058** -0.0046*** 0.0001 
(0.19) (2.38) (3.23) (0.04) 
Risk Tolerance -0.2049 -0.1249 -0.2261 0.8754** 
(0.38) (0.34) (1.04) (2.29) 
Patience -0.0858 0.0338 -0.1671 0.5727 
(0.13) (0.08) (0.66) (1.26) 
Risk Tolerance Patience 0.0545 0.1185 0.4458 -1.0802* 
(0.06) (0.2) (1.3) (1.78) 
Human & Environment 
Safety Concern 
-0.0093 0.0395 0.0145 0.0225 
(0.21) (1.3) (0.83) (0.75) 
Ease of Use Concern 0.0764 0.0494 -0.0207 -0.0175 
(1.49) (1.55) (1.13) (0.56) 
Yield & Yield Loss Concern 0.0149 -0.0260 0.0530** 0.0035 
(0.29) (0.76) (2.53) (0.10) 
Prices & Costs Concern -0.0454 -0.0379 -0.0110 -0.0258 
(0.71) (0.89) (0.45) (0.63) 
Weed Mobility Concern 0.0693 0.0474 0.0516*** 0.0324 
(1.46) (1.49) (2.77) (1.00) 
Neighbor Resistance Concern -0.0338 -0.0058 0.0149 -0.0365 
(0.40) (0.11) (0.46) (0.66) 
Pessimistic Weed Resistance 
Attitude 
0.0068 0.0059 -0.0146 -0.0326 
(0.12) (0.15) (0.66) (0.85) 
Optimistic Weed Resistance 0.0483 0.0530 -0.0411 0.0248 
Attitude (0.66) (1.07) (1.46) (0.51) 
 
 Joint Hypothesis Tests (2 with 3,4,2, and2 degrees 
freedom) 
Risk Tolerance & Patience 0.82 0.99 6.48* 8.24** 
Weed Management Concerns 2.64 4.84 8.28* 1.29 
Weed Mobility & Neighbor 
Resistance Concerns 
2.52 2.32 7.67** 1.66 
Optimistic & Pessimistic 
Weed Resistance Attitudes 
0.44 1.16 2.40 1.05 
         a.
 Statistical significance is noted by 
*
 at the 10% level, 
**
 at the 5% level, 
***
 at the 1% level. 
                    b.
 Results for the region dummies are included in the regression but omitted here to save space. 
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Table 2.10 (continued) Weed Control Methods — Interval Regression Results  
— Mean Parameters Estimates.a.b 
Variable 
Crop 
Rotation 
Planting 
Densities 
Change 
Planting 
Date 
Plant 
Narrow 
Rows 
Use Weed 
Maps 
Crop Acres (1,000) 0.0242 -0.0105 -0.0231 0.0259 0.0271 
(1.36) (0.51) (1.02) (0.93) (0.72) 
Gender (Female = 1) -2.569 0.540 0.339 -0.245 -0.234 
(0.03) (1.49) (0.85) (0.63) (0.52) 
Education (Years) -0.0020 0.0009 -0.0091* 0.0080 0.0213*** 
(0.56) (0.22) (1.91) (1.46) (2.66) 
Farming Experience (Years) -0.0043** -0.0034 -0.0017 0.0117*** 0.0206*** 
(1.99) (1.37) (0.59) (3.39) (3.95) 
Risk Tolerance -0.3540 0.3922 0.0634 0.0797 0.6101 
(1.02) (1.01) (0.15) (0.15) (0.72) 
Patience -0.4750 0.1801 -0.0008 -0.1468 0.3363 
(1.18) (0.39) (0.00) (0.24) (0.35) 
Risk Tolerance Patience 0.4464 -0.3450 -0.0396 0.2230 -0.0347 
(0.82) (0.56) (0.06) (0.27) (0.03) 
Human & Environment 
Safety Concern 
0.0391 0.0450 0.0025 0.0779* -0.0503 
(1.41) (1.37) (0.07) (1.82) (0.85) 
Ease of Use Concern -0.0332 0.0111 0.0105 0.0423 0.0152 
(1.14) (0.33) (0.28) (0.94) (0.23) 
Yield & Yield Loss Concern 0.0607** 0.0700* -0.0166 0.1031** 0.0163 
(1.98) (1.84) (0.41) (2.08) (0.24) 
Prices & Costs Concern -0.0270 0.0256 0.0405 -0.0343 -0.0060 
(0.7) (0.57) (0.81) (0.59) (0.07) 
Weed Mobility Concern 0.0580** 0.0587* 0.1115*** -0.0116 0.1331** 
(2.04) (1.73) (2.87) (0.26) (1.97) 
Neighbor Resistance 
Concern 
0.0100 0.0085 0.0520 0.0727 0.1372 
(0.21) (0.15) (0.80) (0.96) (1.26) 
Pessimistic Weed 
Resistance Attitude 
0.0402 -0.0571 -0.0445 0.0228 -0.1515** 
(1.15) (1.41) (0.98) (0.42) (2.01) 
Optimistic Weed Resistance 
Attitude 
-0.0048 0.0670 0.0293 0.0128 0.0258 
(0.11) (1.30) (0.50) (0.18) (0.27) 
 
 Joint Hypothesis Tests (2 with 3,4,2, and2 degrees freedom) 
Risk Tolerance & Patience 3.25 2.05 0.09 1.20 5.87 
Weed Management 
Concerns 
7.31 6.54 0.89 8.90* 0.82 
Weed Mobility & Neighbor 
Resistance Concerns 
4.18 3.00 8.40** 1.09 4.68* 
Optimistic & Pessimistic 
Weed Resistance Attitudes 
1.36 3.98 1.32 0.20 4.21 
a.
 Statistical significance is noted by 
*
 at the 10% level, 
**
 at the 5% level, 
***
 at the 1% level. 
b.
 Results for the region dummies are included in the regression but omitted here to save space. 
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Table 2.10 (continued). Weed Control Methods — Interval Regression Results  
— Mean Parameters Estimates.a.b 
Variable 
Pre-Emergent 
Herbicide 
Post-Emergent 
Herbicide 
Post-Harvest 
Herbicide 
Crop Acres (1,000) 0.0781*** 0.0410* 0.0629*** 
(3.36) (1.90) (3.07) 
Gender (Female = 1) -0.265 -0.415 0.095 
(0.83) (1.20) (0.30) 
Education (Years) -0.0088** -0.0131*** -0.0028 
(2.09) (3.28) (0.66) 
Farming Experience (Years) -0.0102*** -0.0143*** -0.0006 
(3.76) (5.32) (0.24) 
Risk Tolerance 0.2594 -0.6142 0.8105* 
(0.64) (1.56) (1.92) 
Patience 0.0358 -0.8136* 0.8784* 
(0.08) (1.79) (1.77) 
Risk Tolerance Patience 0.0377 1.1438* -1.3660** 
(0.06) (1.86) (2.05) 
Human & Environment 
Safety Concern 
-0.0430 0.0138 0.0188 
(1.23) (0.44) (0.56) 
Ease of Use Concern -0.0142 -0.0313 0.0266 
(0.40) (0.95) (0.77) 
Yield & Yield Loss Concern 0.0777** 0.0219 -0.0073 
(2.07) (0.62) (0.19) 
Prices & Costs Concern -0.0579 0.0231 0.0066 
(1.19) (0.52) (0.15) 
Weed Mobility Concern 0.0062 -0.0036 0.0758** 
(0.18) (0.11) (2.14) 
Neighbor Resistance 
Concern 
0.1137** 0.0695 0.0096 
(1.96) (1.3) (0.16) 
Pessimistic Weed Resistance 
Attitude 
-0.0119 -0.1101*** 0.0304 
(0.28) (2.66) (0.71) 
Optimistic Weed Resistance 
Attitude 
-0.0558 -0.1323*** 0.0303 
(1.03) (2.60) (0.57) 
 
 Joint Hypothesis Tests (2 with 3,4,2, and2 degrees 
freedom) 
Risk Tolerance & Patience 3.67 3.66 4.77 
Weed Management Concerns 6.72 1.78 1.03 
Weed Mobility & Neighbor 
Resistance Concerns 
3.87 1.74 4.62* 
Optimistic & Pessimistic 
Weed Resistance Attitudes 
1.09 12.32*** 0.75 
        a.
 Statistical significance is noted by 
*
 at the 10% level, 
**
 at the 5% level, 
***
 at the 1% level. 
        b.
 Results for the region dummies are included in the regression but omitted here to save space. 
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Table 2.10 (continued). Weed Control Methods — Interval Regression Results  
— Mean Parameters Estimates.a.b 
Variable 
Herbicide 
Mixes 
Multiple 
Herbicides 
Use Full 
Label Rate 
Rotate 
Herbicide 
Mechanism 
of Action 
Crop Acres (1,000) 0.0326** 0.0434** 0.0236 0.0429*** 
(1.98) (2.41) (1.37) (2.58) 
Gender (Female = 1) -0.145 -0.425 -0.250 0.009 
(0.63) (1.48) (1.03) (0.04) 
Education (Years) -0.0015 -0.0013 -0.0028 -0.0028 
(0.48) (0.37) (0.87) (0.87) 
Farming Experience 
(Years) 
-0.0042** -0.0057*** -0.0009 -0.0020 
(2.18) (2.72) (0.46) (1) 
Risk Tolerance 0.1666 -0.1798 -0.2314 -0.0713 
(0.56) (0.56) (0.73) (0.23) 
Patience -0.3324 -0.6540* -0.2975 -0.4411 
(0.98) (1.79) (0.81) (1.23) 
Risk Tolerance Patience 0.3574 0.7853 0.4430 0.4255 
(0.77) (1.57) (0.89) (0.87) 
Human & Environment 
Safety Concern 
0.0159 -0.0201 -0.0282 0.0416 
(0.65) (0.76) (1.09) (1.62) 
Ease of Use Concern -0.0103 -0.0512* -0.0591** -0.0467* 
(0.4) (1.81) (2.21) (1.74) 
Yield & Yield Loss 
Concern 
0.0388 0.0357 0.0272 0.0500* 
(1.42) (1.21) (0.96) (1.73) 
Prices & Costs Concern 0.0006 0.0075 0.0630* -0.0171 
(0.02) (0.2) (1.8) (0.48) 
Weed Mobility Concern 0.0594** 0.0773*** 0.0200 0.0379 
(2.35) (2.81) (0.76) (1.42) 
Neighbor Resistance 
Concern 
0.0749* 0.0815* 0.0983** 0.0855* 
(1.78) (1.79) (2.21) (1.9) 
Pessimistic Weed 
Resistance Attitude 
0.0085 -0.0066 0.0507 -0.0265 
(0.27) (0.2) (1.57) (0.81) 
Optimistic Weed 
Resistance Attitude 
-0.0360 -0.0815* -0.0915** -0.0786* 
(0.91) (1.89) (2.22) (1.91) 
 
 Joint Hypothesis Tests (2 with 3,4,2, and2 degrees 
freedom) 
Risk Tolerance & Patience 11.62*** 8.15** 0.87 4.38 
Weed Management 
Concerns 
2.68 4.94 8.92* 8.66* 
Weed Mobility & 
Neighbor Resistance 
Concerns 
7.66** 9.88*** 5.18* 4.94* 
Optimistic & Pessimistic 
Weed Resistance Attitudes 
0.96 3.58 8.01** 4.04 
     a.
 Statistical significance is noted by 
*
 at the 10% level, 
**
 at the 5% level, 
***
 at the 1% level. 
     b.
 Results for the region dummies are included in the regression but omitted here to save space. 
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Table 2.11 Weed Control Methods — Interval Regression — Error Correlation Matrix and Standard Deviations.a 
 
Inter-Row 
Cultivation Tillage 
Crop 
Rotation 
Pre-
Emergent 
Herbicide 
Post- 
Emergent 
Herbicide 
Post- 
Harvest 
Herbicide 
Plant 
Densities 
Herbicide 
Mixes 
 Correlations 
Tillage 0.433***        
Crop Rotation 0.081 0.081       
Pre-Emergent Herbicide 0.018 -0.115** 0.227***      
Post-Emergent Herbicide -0.263*** -0.088 -0.006 0.226***     
Post-Harvest Herbicide 0.091 -0.187*** 0.058 0.036 0.053    
Plant Densities 0.089 0.071 0.097* -0.053 -0.065 0.197***   
Herbicide Mixes -0.062 -0.136*** 0.190*** 0.265*** 0.268*** 0.142** 0.102*  
Multiple Herbicides -0.132** -0.136*** 0.231*** 0.303*** 0.271*** 0.081 -0.026 0.714*** 
Hand Weeding 0.148** 0.027 0.125** 0.272*** -0.001 0.182*** 0.019 0.043 
Use Full Label Rate -0.023 0.057 0.183*** 0.260*** 0.210*** 0.100* 0.002 0.196*** 
Mulches/ Cover Crop -0.011 -0.220*** 0.140** 0.146** -0.122* 0.154*** 0.120** 0.135** 
Change Planting Date 0.035 0.012 0.032 0.004 -0.071 0.173*** 0.301*** -0.041 
Rotating Herbicide MOA -0.047 -0.060 0.349*** 0.274*** 0.130** 0.134** 0.078 0.315*** 
Narrow Rows -0.117* -0.080 0.149*** 0.075 0.151** 0.031 0.226*** 0.151*** 
Weed Maps 0.067 -0.019 0.089 -0.045 -0.053 0.143** 0.320*** -0.049 
 Standard Deviations 
 0.674*** 0.584*** 0.495*** 0.584*** 0.510*** 0.588*** 0.596*** 0.444*** 
 
 
Multiple 
Herbicides 
Hand 
Weeding 
Use Full 
Label Rate 
Mulches/ 
Cover 
Crop 
Change 
Planting 
Date  
Rotating 
Herbicide 
MOA  
Plant 
Narrow 
Rows 
Weed Maps 
 Correlations 
Hand Weeding 0.148***        
Use Full Label Rate 0.275*** 0.098*       
Mulches/ Cover Crop  0.038 0.079 0.027      
Change Planting Date -0.115** 0.092* -0.022 0.182***     
Rotating Herbicide MOA 0.324*** 0.123** 0.174*** 0.060 0.190***    
Narrow Rows 0.159*** 0.107** 0.112** 0.078 0.094* 0.233***   
Weed Maps -0.034 0.168** -0.019 0.177** 0.186*** 0.120* 0.239***  
 Standard Deviations 
 0.328*** 0.449*** 0.514*** 0.634*** 0.490*** 0.791*** 0.835*** 0.328*** 
a.
 Statistical significance is noted by 
*
 at the 10% level, 
**
 at the 5% level, 
***
 at the 1% level.  
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Table 2.12 Weed Control Methods — Error Correlation Factor Analysis — Oblique Quartimin Rotation Factor Loadings, Uniqueness and 
Correlation. 
a.b
 
 Loadings  Uniqueness 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 Factor 6 Factor 7 Factor 8 Factor 9   
Herbicide Mixes 0.824 0.003 -0.003 0.046 -0.015 -0.056 0.035 0.028 0.061  0.344 
Multiple Herbicides 0.741 0.087 0.003 -0.030 0.024 0.079 -0.003 -0.106 -0.045  0.333 
Rotating Herbicide MOA 0.119 0.469 0.003 -0.090 0.019 0.052 0.042 0.149 -0.094  0.629 
Crop Rotation 0.030 0.440 0.079 0.090 0.052 0.001 -0.024 -0.040 0.098  0.713 
Use Full Label Rate 0.018 0.092 0.409 0.052 0.003 0.026 0.058 -0.034 0.007  0.782 
Post-Harvest Herbicide 0.133 -0.100 0.332 -0.191 0.042 0.045 -0.010 0.065 -0.202  0.678 
Tillage -0.046 0.029 0.068 0.621 0.027 -0.030 -0.132 0.026 -0.151  0.560 
Inter -Row Cultivation 0.020 0.001 -0.064 0.606 -0.063 0.118 0.084 -0.017 0.045  0.580 
Weed Maps -0.071 0.014 -0.070 0.019 0.454 0.088 0.083 0.018 0.064  0.704 
Narrow Rows 0.052 0.088 0.072 -0.113 0.432 0.034 -0.076 0.034 -0.030  0.737 
Plant Densities 0.083 -0.045 0.005 0.181 0.363 -0.136 0.120 0.187 0.084  0.652 
Hand Weeding -0.003 0.015 0.006 0.087 0.088 0.440 0.086 -0.017 0.004  0.742 
Pre-Emergent Herbicide 0.094 0.100 0.245 -0.041 -0.126 0.333 -0.094 0.074 0.143  0.634 
Post-Emergent Herbicide 0.033 0.004 0.057 -0.046 -0.003 0.046 0.456 0.048 0.013  0.741 
Change Planting Date -0.113 0.086 -0.044 0.029 0.068 0.003 0.114 0.347 0.065  0.738 
Mulches/ Cover Crop  0.036 0.023 -0.014 -0.110 0.049 0.036 0.044 0.050 0.433  0.733 
 
 Factor Correlation 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 Factor 6 Factor 7 Factor 8 
Factor 2 0.434        
Factor 3 0.569 0.403       
Factor 4 -0.267 0.092 -0.183      
Factor 5 0.072 0.285 0.020 0.012     
Factor 6 0.205 0.408 0.382 0.025 0.070    
Factor 7 0.108 0.032 -0.097 0.075 0.319 0.292   
Factor 8 0.025 0.265 0.070 -0.061 0.500 -0.022 0.479  
Factor 9 0.005 0.260 -0.245 0.000 0.158 0.222 0.449 0.192 
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Figure 2.1 Illustration of Non-Pecuniary Comparative Equilibrium Analysis 
for Hypothesis IV 
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Figure 2.2 Types of Field Crops Planted in 2015 
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Figure 2.3 Change in Tactic due to a One Standard Deviation Increase in the Control Variable. (Acres; Edu; Year-Farming) 
 
Note: The numbers in parentheses are the estimate averaged for each tactic, total tactics, treated acres and Herfindahl index. 
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Figure 2.4 Change in Tactic due to a One Standard Deviation Increase in the Control Variable. (Risk Tolerance; Patience) 
 
Note: The numbers in parentheses are the estimate averaged for each tactic, total tactics, treated acres and Herfindahl index. 
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Figure 2.5 Change in Tactic due to a One Standard Deviation Increase in the Control Variable. (Weed Mobility; Neighbor Resistance) 
 
Note: The numbers in parentheses are the estimate averaged for each tactic, total tactics, treated acres and Herfindahl index. 
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Figure 2.6 Change in Tactic due to a One Standard Deviation Increase in the Control Variable. (Safety; Ease of Use; Yield; Price) 
 
Note: The numbers in parentheses are the estimate averaged for each tactic, total tactics, treated acres and Herfindahl index. 
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Figure 2.7 Change in Tactic due to a One Standard Deviation Increase in the Control Variable. (Pessimism; Optimism) 
 
Note: The numbers in parentheses are the estimate averaged for each tactic, total tactics, treated acres and Herfindahl index. 
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2.6 Appendix.A Equation Derivation 
The purpose of this appendix is to more formally derive the comparative static and 
comparative equilibrium results used to motivate Hypotheses I - IV.  For all four 
hypotheses, we assume 
𝜕𝑅𝑖(𝑒𝑖)
𝜕𝑒𝑖
≥ 0, 
𝜕2𝑅𝑖(𝑒𝑖)
𝜕𝑒𝑖
2 ≤ 0, (
𝜕𝐶𝑖(𝑒𝑖)
𝜕𝑒𝑖
> 0, 
𝜕2𝐶𝑖(𝑒𝑖)
𝜕𝑒𝑖
2 ≥ 0, 
𝜕𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖,𝐸𝑖,𝜌𝑖)
𝜕𝜋𝑖
> 0, 
and 
𝜕2𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖,𝐸𝑖,𝜌𝑖)
𝜕𝜋𝑖
2 ≤ 0.   
For Hypothesis I, we also assume 
𝜕𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖,𝐸𝑖,𝜌𝑖)
𝜕𝐸𝑖
𝜕𝐸𝑖(𝑒𝑖)
𝜕𝑒𝑖
= 0 and 
𝜕𝑝𝑖(𝑒𝑖,𝑒𝑗,𝜓𝑖)
𝜕𝑒𝑖
< 0 such that 
equation 2.2 can be written as 
𝜕𝐸𝑈𝑖
𝜕𝑒𝑖
= 
𝜕𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
0,𝐸𝑖,𝜌𝑖)
𝜕𝜋𝑖
 (
𝜕𝑅𝑖(𝑒𝑖)
𝜕𝑒𝑖
−
𝜕𝐶𝑖(𝑒𝑖)
𝜕𝑒𝑖
)  
            −𝜌𝛿𝑖(1 − 𝜙𝑖)
𝜕𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
0,𝐸𝑖,𝜌𝑖)
𝜕𝜋𝑖
𝜕𝑝𝑖(𝑒𝑖,𝑒𝑗,𝜓𝑖)
𝜕𝑒𝑖
𝜕2𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
0,𝐸𝑖,𝜌𝑖)
𝜕𝜋𝑖
2
(𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
1, 𝐸𝑖 , 𝜌𝑖) − 𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
2, 𝐸𝑖, 𝜌𝑖)) = 0  
A.1 
where −𝜌 =
𝜕2𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
0,𝐸𝑖,𝜌𝑖)
𝜕𝜋𝑖
2
𝜕𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
0,𝐸𝑖,𝜌𝑖)
𝜕𝜋𝑖
 is also assumed to the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of constant 
absolute risk aversion.  The implicit function theory then implies 
𝑑𝑒𝑖
𝑑𝜌
=
 −
𝛿𝑖(1−𝜙𝑖)
𝜕𝑝𝑖(𝑒𝑖,𝑒𝑗,𝜓𝑖)
𝜕𝑒𝑖
(𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
1,𝐸𝑖,𝜌𝑖)−𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
2,𝐸𝑖,𝜌𝑖))
(
 
 
 
 
 
 −
𝜕2𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
0,𝐸𝑖,𝜌𝑖)
𝜕𝜋𝑖𝜕𝜌
𝜕𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
0,𝐸𝑖,𝜌𝑖)
𝜕𝜋𝑖
𝜌𝑖
+
𝜕(𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
2,𝐸𝑖,𝜌𝑖)−𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
1,𝐸𝑖,𝜌𝑖))
𝜕𝜌𝑖
𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
2,𝐸𝑖,𝜌𝑖)−𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
1,𝐸𝑖,𝜌𝑖)
)
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝜕2𝐸𝑈𝑖
𝜕𝑒𝑖
2
  
A.2 
and 
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𝑑𝑒𝑖
𝑑𝛿𝑖
= −
(1−𝜙𝑖)
𝜕𝑝𝑖(𝑒𝑖,𝑒𝑗,𝜓𝑖)
𝜕𝑒𝑖
(𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
1,𝐸𝑖,𝜌𝑖)−𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
2,𝐸𝑖,𝜌𝑖))
𝜕2𝐸𝑈𝑖
𝜕𝑒𝑖
2
. 
A.3 
Since 
𝜕2𝐸𝑈𝑖
𝜕𝑒𝑖
2 < 0 for a maximum the signs of equations A.2 and A.3 depend on the signs 
of the numerator. Since 𝜋𝑖
2 > 𝜋𝑖
1  and the marginal utility of profit is positive, 
𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
1, 𝐸𝑖 , 𝜌𝑖) − 𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
2, 𝐸𝑖, 𝜌𝑖) < 0 implying the numerator for equation A.3 equations is 
positive.  The sign of equation A.2 is indeterminate without additional assumptions. 
For Hypothesis II, we again assume 
𝜕𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖,𝐸𝑖,𝜌𝑖)
𝜕𝑒𝑖
= 0  and 
𝜕𝑝𝑖(𝑒𝑖,𝑒𝑗,𝜓𝑖)
𝜕𝑒𝑖
< 0  such that 
equation 2.2 can be written as 
𝜕𝐸𝑈𝑖
𝜕𝑒𝑖
=  
𝜕𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
0,𝐸𝑖,𝜌𝑖)
𝜕𝜋𝑖
(
𝜕𝑅𝑖(𝑒𝑖)
𝜕𝑒𝑖
−
𝜕𝐶𝑖(𝑒𝑖)
𝜕𝑒𝑖
)  
            +𝛿𝑖(1 − 𝜙𝑖)
𝜕𝑝𝑖(𝑒𝑖,𝑒𝑗,𝜓𝑖)
𝜕𝑒𝑖
(𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
1, 𝐸𝑖 , 𝜌𝑖) − 𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
2, 𝐸𝑖 , 𝜌𝑖)) = 0. 
A.4 
Applying the implicit function theory again yields 
𝑑𝑒𝑖
𝑑𝜙𝑖
= −
−𝛿𝑖
𝜕𝑝𝑖(𝑒𝑖,𝑒𝑗,𝜓𝑖)
𝜕𝑒𝑖
(𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
1,𝐸𝑖,𝜌𝑖)−𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
2,𝐸𝑖,𝜌𝑖))
𝜕2𝐸𝑈𝑖
𝜕𝑒𝑖
2
  
A.5 
and 
𝑑𝑒𝑖
𝑑𝜓𝑖
= −
𝛿𝑖(1−𝜙𝑖)
𝜕𝑝𝑖(𝑒𝑖,𝑒𝑗,𝜓𝑖)
𝜕𝑒𝑖𝜕𝜓𝑖
(𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
1,𝐸𝑖,𝜌𝑖)−𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
2,𝐸𝑖,𝜌𝑖))
𝜕2𝐸𝑈𝑖
𝜕𝑒𝑖
2
. 
A.6 
Again, with 
𝜕2𝐸𝑈𝑖
𝜕𝑒𝑖
2 < 0 and 𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
1, 𝐸𝑖 , 𝜌𝑖) − 𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
2, 𝐸𝑖, 𝜌𝑖) < 0, the sign of equations A.5 
and A.6 will be negative.   
Now consider the effect of increased pest mobility affecting how much neighboring 
farmers diverse weed management efforts affect a farmer’s diverse weed management 
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practices as in Hypothesis III. This analysis is accomplished by assuming 𝑝𝑖(𝑒𝑖, 𝑒𝑗 , 𝜓𝑖) =
𝑝𝑖(𝑒𝑖, 𝛼𝑖𝑒𝑗, 𝜓𝑖)|𝛼𝑖=1
 and evaluating how an increase in 𝛼𝑖  affects 𝑒𝑖 when 𝑒𝑖  and 𝑒𝑗  are 
jointly determined in a Nash equilibrium.  In this circumstance, the Nash equilibrium 
efforts are defined by the solution to 
𝜕𝐸𝑈𝑖
𝜕𝑒𝑖
=
  
𝜕𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
0,𝐸𝑖,𝜌𝑖)
𝜕𝜋𝑖
(
𝜕𝑅𝑖(𝑒𝑖)
𝜕𝑒𝑖
−
𝜕𝐶𝑖(𝑒𝑖)
𝜕𝑒𝑖
) + 𝛿𝑖(1 − 𝜙𝑖)
𝜕𝑝𝑖(𝑒𝑖,𝛼𝑖𝑒𝑗,𝜓𝑖)|𝛼𝑖=1
𝜕𝑒𝑖
(𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
1, 𝐸𝑖 , 𝜌𝑖) −
𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
2, 𝐸𝑖 , 𝜌𝑖)) = 0  
A.7 
and 
𝜕𝐸𝑈𝑗
𝜕𝑒𝑗
=  
𝜕𝑢𝑗(𝜋𝑗
0,𝐸𝑗,𝜌𝑗)
𝜕𝜋𝑗
(
𝜕𝑅𝑗(𝑒𝑗)
𝜕𝑒𝑗
−
𝜕𝐶𝑗(𝑒𝑗)
𝜕𝑒𝑗
) + 𝛿𝑗(1 − 𝜙𝑗)
𝜕𝑝𝑗(𝑒𝑗,𝑒𝑖,𝜓𝑗)
𝜕𝑒𝑗
(𝑢𝑗(𝜋𝑗
1, 𝐸𝑗, 𝜌𝑖) −
𝑢𝑗(𝜋𝑗
2, 𝐸𝑗, 𝜌𝑖)) = 0. 
A.8 
Applying the implicit function theorem and Cramer’s rule yields 
𝑑𝑒𝑖
𝑑𝛼𝑖
|
𝛼𝑖=1
= −|
|
𝜕2𝐸𝑈𝑖
𝜕𝑒𝑖𝜕𝛼𝑖
𝜕2𝐸𝑈𝑖
𝜕𝑒𝑖𝜕𝑒𝑗
0
𝜕2𝐸𝑈𝑗
𝜕𝑒𝑗2
|
|
|
|
𝜕2𝐸𝑈𝑖
𝜕𝑒𝑖2
𝜕2𝐸𝑈𝑖
𝜕𝑒𝑖𝜕𝑒𝑗
𝜕2𝐸𝑈𝑗
𝜕𝑒𝑗𝜕𝑒𝑖
𝜕2𝐸𝑈𝑗
𝜕𝑒𝑗2
|
|
−1
= −
𝜕2𝐸𝑈𝑖
𝜕𝑒𝑖𝜕𝛼𝑖
𝜕2𝐸𝑈𝑗
𝜕𝑒𝑗2
𝜕2𝐸𝑈𝑖
𝜕𝑒𝑖2
𝜕2𝐸𝑈𝑗
𝜕𝑒𝑗2
−
𝜕2𝐸𝑈𝑖
𝜕𝑒𝑖𝜕𝑒𝑗
𝜕2𝐸𝑈𝑗
𝜕𝑒𝑗𝜕𝑒𝑖
 A.9 
where 
𝜕2𝐸𝑈𝑖
𝜕𝑒𝑖𝜕𝑒𝑗
|
𝛼𝑖=1
= 𝛿𝑖(1 − 𝜙𝑖)
𝜕2𝑝𝑖(𝑒𝑖,𝑒𝑗,𝜓𝑖)
𝜕𝑒𝑖𝜕𝑒𝑗
(𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
1, 𝐸𝑖, 𝜌𝑖) − 𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
2, 𝐸𝑖, 𝜌𝑖)) ∝ −
𝜕2𝑝𝑖(𝑒𝑖,𝑒𝑗,𝜓𝑖)
𝜕𝑒𝑖𝜕𝑒𝑗
, 
𝜕2𝐸𝑈𝑖
𝜕𝑒𝑗𝜕𝑒𝑖
= 𝛿𝑗 (1 − 𝜙𝑗)
𝜕2𝑝𝑗(𝑒𝑗,𝑒𝑖,𝜓𝑗)
𝜕𝑒𝑗𝜕𝑒𝑖
(𝑢𝑗(𝜋𝑗
1, 𝐸𝑗, 𝜌𝑖) − 𝑢𝑗(𝜋𝑗
2, 𝐸𝑗, 𝜌𝑖)) ∝ −
𝜕2𝑝𝑗(𝑒𝑗,𝑒𝑖,𝜓𝑗)
𝜕𝑒𝑗𝜕𝑒𝑖
, and 
𝜕2𝐸𝑈𝑖
𝜕𝑒𝑖𝜕𝛼𝑖
|
𝛼𝑖=1
= 𝛿𝑖(1 − 𝜙𝑖)𝑒𝑗
𝜕2𝑝𝑖(𝑒𝑖,𝑒𝑗,𝜓𝑖)
𝜕𝑒𝑖𝜕𝑒𝑗
(𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
1, 𝐸𝑖, 𝜌𝑖) − 𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
2, 𝐸𝑖, 𝜌𝑖)) ∝ −
𝜕2𝑝𝑖(𝑒𝑖,𝑒𝑗,𝜓𝑖)
𝜕𝑒𝑖𝜕𝑒𝑗
. 
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because 𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
1, 𝐸𝑖, 𝜌𝑖) − 𝑢𝑖(𝜋𝑖
2, 𝐸𝑖 , 𝜌𝑖) < 0, 
𝜕2𝐸𝑈𝑖
𝜕𝑒𝑖
2 < 0, and 
𝜕2𝐸𝑈𝑗
𝜕𝑒𝑗
2 < 0. Therefore, the sign 
of 
𝑑𝑒𝑖
𝑑𝛼𝑖
|
𝛼𝑖=1
depends on 
𝜕𝑝𝑖(𝑒𝑖,𝑒𝑗,𝜓𝑖)
𝜕𝑒𝑖𝜕𝑒𝑗
 and 
𝜕𝑝𝑗(𝑒𝑗,𝑒𝑖,𝜓𝑖)
𝜕𝑒𝑗𝜕𝑒𝑖
 as summarized in Table 2.1. 
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2.7 Appendix.B Robustness Regression Results 
Table Appendix1 Weed Control Methods — Linear Regression Results a.b 
Variable 
Inter-Row 
Cultivation 
Tillage 
Hand 
Weeding 
Mulches/ 
Cover 
Crops 
Crop 
Rotation 
Planting 
Densities 
Change 
Planting 
Date 
Plant 
Narrow 
Rows 
Use Weed 
Maps 
Crop Acres (1,000) 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000** 0.0000 0.0000 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Gender (Female = 1) 
-1.2745** -0.1885 -0.0531 0.0141 -2.5694* 0.5399 0.3395 -0.2451 -0.2337 
(0.44) (0.28) (0.15) (0.29) (83.93) (0.36) (0.40) (0.39) (0.45) 
Education (Years) 
0.0017 -0.0046 0.0016 -0.0026 -0.0020 0.0009 -0.0091* 0.0080 0.0213** 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
Farming Experience 
(Years) 
-0.0007 -0.0058** -0.0046** 0.0001 -0.0043** -0.0034 -0.0017 0.0117** 0.0206** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Risk Tolerance 
-0.2049 -0.1249 -0.2261 0.8754* -0.3540 0.3922 0.0634 0.0797 0.6101 
(0.54) (0.37) (0.22) (0.38) (0.35) (0.39) (0.43) (0.51) (0.85) 
Patience 
-0.0858 0.0338 -0.1671 0.5727 -0.4750 0.1801 -0.0008 -0.1468 0.3363 
(0.64) (0.44) (0.25) (0.45) (0.40) (0.46) (0.50) (0.60) (0.97) 
Risk Tolerance´ 
Patience 
0.0545 0.1185 0.4458 -1.0802* 0.4464 -0.3450 -0.0396 0.2230 -0.0347 
(0.87) (0.59) (0.34) (0.61) (0.54) (0.62) (0.68) (0.82) (1.28) 
Human & Environment 
Safety Concern 
-0.0093 0.0395 0.0145 0.0225 0.0391 0.0450 0.0025 0.0779* -0.0503 
(0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) 
Ease of Use Concern 
0.0764* 0.0494 -0.0207 -0.0175 -0.0332 0.0111 0.0105 0.0423 0.0152 
(0.05) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) 
Yield & Yield Loss 
Concern 
0.0149 -0.0260 0.0530* 0.0035 0.0607** 0.0700 -0.0166 0.1031** 0.0163 
(0.05) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) 
Prices & Costs Concern 
-0.0454 -0.0379 -0.0110 -0.0258 -0.0270 0.0256 0.0405 -0.0343 -0.0060 
(0.06) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) 
Weed Mobility Concern 
0.0693 0.0474 0.0516** 0.0324 0.0580** 0.0587 0.1115** -0.0116 0.1331* 
(0.05) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) 
Neighbor Resistance 
Concern 
-0.0338 -0.0058 0.0149 -0.0365 0.0100 0.0085 0.0520 0.0727 0.1372 
(0.08) (0.05) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.11) 
Pessimistic Weed 
Resistance Attitude 
0.0068 0.0059 -0.0146 -0.0326 0.0402 -0.0571 -0.0445 0.0228 -0.1515** 
(0.06) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) 
Optimistic Weed 
Resistance Attitude 
0.0483 0.0530 -0.0411 0.0248 -0.0048 0.0670 0.0293 0.0128 0.0258 
(0.07) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.10) 
       a.
 Statistical significance is noted by 
*
 at the 10% level, 
**
 at the 5% level, 
***
 at the 1% level. 
       b.
 Results for the region dummies are included in the regression but omitted here to save space. 
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Table Appendix1 (continued) Weed Control Methods — Linear Regression Results a.b 
 
a.
 Statistical significance is noted by 
*
 at the 10% level, 
**
 at the 5% level, 
***
 at the 1% level. 
                             b.
 Results for the region dummies are included in the regression but omitted here to save space. 
Variable 
Pre-
Emergent 
Herbicide 
Post-
Emergent 
Herbicide 
Post-
Harvest 
Herbicide 
Herbicide 
Mixes 
Multiple 
Herbicides 
Use Full 
Label 
Rate 
Rotate 
Herbicide 
Mechanism 
of Action 
Crop Acres (1,000) 
0.0001** 0.0000 0.0001** 0.0000 0.0000** 0.0000 0.0000** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Gender (Female = 1) 
-0.2649 -0.4149 0.0945 -0.1454 -0.4253* -0.2502 0.0092 
(0.32) (0.35) (0.31) (0.23) (0.29) (0.24) (0.23) 
Education (Years) 
-0.0088* -0.0131** -0.0028 -0.0015 -0.0013 -0.0028 -0.0028 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Farming Experience 
(Years) 
-0.0102** -0.0143** -0.0006 -0.0042** -0.0057** -0.0009 -0.0020 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Risk Tolerance 
0.2594 -0.6142 0.8105* 0.1666 -0.1798 -0.2314 -0.0713 
(0.41) (0.39) (0.42) (0.30) (0.32) (0.32) (0.31) 
Patience 
0.0358 -0.8136* 0.8784* -0.3324 -0.6540** -0.2975 -0.4411 
(0.47) (0.45) (0.50) (0.34) (0.37) (0.37) (0.36) 
Risk Tolerance 
Patience 
0.0377 1.1438* -1.3660* 0.3574 0.7853** 0.4430 0.4255 
(0.64) (0.62) (0.67) (0.46) (0.50) (0.50) (0.49) 
Human & Environment 
Safety Concern 
-0.0430 0.0138 0.0188 0.0159 -0.0201 -0.0282 0.0416* 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Ease of Use Concern 
-0.0142 -0.0313 0.0266 -0.0103 -0.0512* -0.0591** -0.0467* 
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Yield & Yield Loss 
Concern 
0.0777** 0.0219 -0.0073 0.0388 0.0357 0.0272 0.0500* 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Prices & Costs 
Concern 
-0.0579 0.0231 0.0066 0.0006 0.0075 0.0630** -0.0171 
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) 
Weed Mobility 
Concern 
0.0062 -0.0036 0.0758** 0.0594** 0.0773** 0.0200 0.0379 
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Neighbor Resistance 
Concern 
0.1137** 0.0695 0.0096 0.0749* 0.0815 0.0983** 0.0855* 
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) 
Pessimistic Weed 
Resistance Attitude 
-0.0119 -0.1101** 0.0304 0.0085 -0.0066 0.0507 -0.0265 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Optimistic Weed 
Resistance Attitude 
-0.0558 -0.1323** 0.0303 -0.0360 -0.0815** -0.0915* -0.0786** 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
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Table Appendix2 Weed Control Methods — Ordered Probit Regression Results a.b 
Variable 
Inter-Row 
Cultivation 
Tillage 
Hand 
Weeding 
Mulches/ 
Cover 
Crops 
Crop 
Rotation 
Planting 
Densities 
Change 
Planting 
Date 
Plant 
Narrow 
Rows 
Use Weed 
Maps 
Crop Acres (1,000) 
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001** 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Gender (Female = 1) 
-1.9710*** -0.3365 -0.1833 -0.0293 -4.8489*** 0.8377 0.5576 -0.3337 -0.2410 
(0.65) (0.48) (0.46) (0.55) (0.59) (0.60) (0.64) (0.49) (0.54) 
Education (Years) 
0.0018 -0.0078 0.0043 -0.0053 -0.0041 0.0017 -0.0143** 0.0108 0.0259*** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Farming Experience 
(Years) 
-0.0012 -0.0101** -0.0135*** -0.0003 -0.0090** -0.0058 -0.0028 0.0146*** 0.0246*** 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Risk Tolerance 
-0.3837 -0.1914 -0.6030 1.7483** -0.8980 0.5532 0.0050 0.1583 0.5243 
(0.79) (0.64) (0.66) (0.74) (0.71) (0.65) (0.67) (0.65) (1.01) 
Patience 
-0.2320 0.0702 -0.4213 1.1812 -1.1922 0.1819 -0.1087 -0.0963 0.2080 
(0.94) (0.74) (0.78) (0.88) (0.81) (0.77) (0.79) (0.76) (1.16) 
Risk Tolerance´ 
Patience 
0.2110 0.1871 1.2433 -2.2004* 1.2084 -0.4159 0.0968 0.2232 0.2523 
(1.29) (1.01) (1.05) (1.18) (1.10) (1.04) (1.07) (1.03) (1.53) 
Human & Environment 
Safety Concern 
-0.0109 0.0684 0.0452 0.0477 0.0791 0.0751 0.0028 0.1019** -0.0633 
(0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) 
Ease of Use Concern 
0.1152 0.0847 -0.0600 -0.0296 -0.0724 0.0159 0.0182 0.0460 0.0176 
(0.08) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) 
Yield & Yield Loss 
Concern 
0.0262 -0.0386 0.1727*** 0.0039 0.1197* 0.1173** -0.0297 0.1323** 0.0193 
(0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) 
Prices & Costs Concern 
-0.0683 -0.0690 -0.0438 -0.0539 -0.0617 0.0396 0.0599 -0.0350 -0.0125 
(0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.10) 
Weed Mobility Concern 
0.1007 0.0826 0.1592*** 0.0606 0.1089* 0.0981* 0.1723*** -0.0211 0.1544** 
(0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) 
Neighbor Resistance 
Concern 
-0.0537 -0.0101 0.0567 -0.0723 0.0177 0.0179 0.0783 0.0845 0.1633 
(0.13) (0.09) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.13) 
Pessimistic Weed 
Resistance Attitude 
0.0124 0.0135 -0.0515 -0.0647 0.0856 -0.1017 -0.0745 0.0302 -0.1822** 
(0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) 
Optimistic Weed 
Resistance Attitude 
0.0712 0.0920 -0.1176 0.0507 -0.0115 0.1142 0.0453 0.0093 0.0301 
(0.11) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.12) 
       a.
 Statistical significance is noted by 
*
 at the 10% level, 
**
 at the 5% level, 
***
 at the 1% level. 
       b.
 Results for the region dummies are included in the regression but omitted here to save space. 
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Table Appendix2 (continued) Weed Control Methods — Ordered Probit Regression Results a.b 
Variable 
Pre-
Emergent 
Herbicide 
Post-
Emergent 
Herbicide 
Post-
Harvest 
Herbicide 
Herbicide 
Mixes 
Multiple 
Herbicides 
Use Full 
Label 
Rate 
Rotate 
Herbicide 
Mechanism 
of Action 
Crop Acres (1,000) 
0.0001*** 0.0001 0.0001*** 0.0001 0.0001** 0.0001 0.0001** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Gender (Female = 1) 
-0.4466 -0.8196 0.1521 -0.3682 -0.9891 -0.5494 -0.0955 
(0.54) (0.67) (0.53) (0.52) (0.60) (0.54) (0.46) 
Education (Years) 
-0.0151** -0.0262*** -0.0053 -0.0047 -0.0034 -0.0058 -0.0054 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Farming Experience 
(Years) 
-0.0175*** -0.0286*** -0.0011 -0.0102** -0.0127*** -0.0021 -0.0041 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Risk Tolerance 
0.4843 -1.3041* 1.3571* 0.4089 -0.2218 -0.4807 -0.0852 
(0.69) (0.77) (0.72) (0.67) (0.67) (0.71) (0.63) 
Patience 
0.0856 -1.7114* 1.4781* -0.7154 -1.2494 -0.6553 -0.8983 
(0.80) (0.89) (0.84) (0.76) (0.77) (0.82) (0.73) 
Risk Tolerance 
Patience 
-0.0011 2.3925** -2.2955** 0.7015 1.3988 0.9483 0.7944 
(1.10) (1.20) (1.13) (1.05) (1.06) (1.11) (0.99) 
Human & Environment 
Safety Concern 
-0.0748 0.0228 0.0329** 0.0243 -0.0324 -0.0646 0.0812 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) 
Ease of Use Concern 
-0.0256 -0.0527 0.0444 -0.0198 -0.0960 -0.1339** -0.0993* 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) 
Yield & Yield Loss 
Concern 
0.1398** 0.0352 -0.0127 0.0833 0.0808 0.0583 0.1003* 
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Prices & Costs 
Concern 
-0.1035 0.0389 0.0134 0.0062 -0.0018 0.1442* -0.0275 
(0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) 
Weed Mobility 
Concern 
0.0023 -0.0121 0.1267 0.1228** 0.1537*** 0.0393 0.0680 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) 
Neighbor Resistance 
Concern 
0.2029** 0.1394 0.0173 0.1515 0.1669* 0.2279** 0.1626* 
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) 
Pessimistic Weed 
Resistance Attitude 
-0.0304 -0.2218*** 0.0526 0.0302 -0.0091 0.1137 -0.0531 
(0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Optimistic Weed 
Resistance Attitude 
-0.0917 -0.2632*** 0.0520 -0.0860 -0.1717* -0.2189** -0.1659** 
(0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) 
 a. Statistical significance is noted by * at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, *** at the 1% level. 
                              b.
 Results for the region dummies are included in the regression but omitted here to save space. 
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3 Look Inside A Seed: An Analysis of the Demand for Traits in the U.S. Corn 
Seed Market 
3.1 Introduction 
The application of genetic engineering (GE) to agriculture commercially introduced 
plant-incorporated-protectants (PIPs) and herbicide tolerant traits to corn and other crops. 
PIP traits make it so the corn plant produces proteins that are toxic when consumed by 
the European corn borer (ECB) and corn rootworm (CRW). While with herbicide tolerant 
traits (HT), such as Roundup Ready and Liberty Link, corn plants manage to survive 
exposure to herbicide that would normally kill it. The ultimate goal of this study is to 
assess the economic-biological impacts of the introduction and diffusion of GE varieties 
in the U.S. corn market. To achieve this, we investigate the farmers’ willingness to pay 
for GE traits.  
Since its first commercial introduction in 1996, GE corn varieties have contributed to 
agricultural productivity growth and exhibited rapid adoption among U.S. farmers 
(Fernandez-Cornejo 2004). From 2000 to 2010, GE corn planted area for all purposes 
expanded from 20 percent to 90 percent of the total U.S. corn acreage. There are two 
crucial factors of GE corn variety demand: the price of GE corn seed and the efficacy of 
the GE trait. GE corn seed is the product of direct manipulation of the genetic makeup, 
and may be patented by different biotech firms. A GE seed can carry either a single trait 
or a combination of several traits. If a seed includes more than one trait, it is referred to as 
stacked if the different traits target different pests; or pyramided if the different traits are 
target the same pest; or both. When marketed to farmers, GE seeds are typically priced 
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higher than conventional seeds (seeds that are not genetically engineered), while stacked 
or/and pyramided seeds are priced higher than single-trait seeds (Shi, Chavas, and 
Stiegert, 2010). From a business operating perspective, seed trait bundling has become a 
well-known business strategy for firms with patent rights to increase market share, prices 
and profit. Note that the marginal production cost of GE varieties is approximately the 
same as the marginal production cost of conventional varieties (Ciliberto, Moschini and 
Perry, 2017). The marginal cost of inserting one more gene into corn seed is much lower 
compared to the profit increase brought by patent rights. Moreover, the U.S. corn seed 
markets have changed significantly over last twenty years (Fernandez-Cornejo 2004). 
Through ongoing restructuring and consolidation, by 2007, patented seeds from six 
biotech firms were planted on over 75 percent of U.S. corn acreage (Stiegert, et al., 
2010). Therefore, the bundling, bundle pricing and strategic behavior of seed firms under 
imperfect competition will all be reflected in the price of GE corn seed. 
There exists limited research on the pricing of traits in the U.S. corn seed market. Shi, 
Chavas and Stiegert (2010) estimate hedonic regressions and find that, GE seeds 
generated statistically significant premiums over conventional seeds, which can be driven 
by price discrimination associated with imperfect competition. Their empirical results 
also indicate the potential prevalence of sub-additive pricing of stacked GE traits. Such 
trait bundle pricing offers benefits to farmers exhibiting strong demand for multiple 
complementary traits (Shi, Chavas, Stiegert and Meng, 2012). By examining a discrete 
choice model, Ciliberto, Moschini and Perry (2017) examine the welfare impact of GE 
traits. From their demand estimates, they find that not only are farmers willing to pay a 
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significant premium for GE traits stacked in seed, but the extent of this willingness to pay 
has increased significantly over time.  
Besides analyzing the bundle pricing and premium in price, Ma and Shi (2013) find 
that the embedded stacked GE traits, contribute significantly to the survival of corn seed 
varieties, which leads to our discussion of the other factor of GE corn demand. High 
efficacy and full season control provided by the GE traits result in the rapid adoption by 
farmers, while the rapid adoption raises concerns that the pests and weeds will develop 
resistance (Secchi, Hurley, Babcock and Hellmich, 2006). Resistance management (RM), 
aiming to prevent or slow the evolution of resistance, is an application of population 
genetics and ecology (Onstad and Gassmann, 2014).  
For a specific type of pest, assume resistance is a monogenic trait that resides at a 
single locus with one allele for resistance and a second allele that confers susceptibility. 
With no cross resistance, pyramiding GE traits into one corn plant is a simple strategy to 
delay the resistance. From an RM perspective, the GE trait pyramiding can be beneficial 
because there is a smaller chance for a pest to survive and develop multiple monogenic 
resistances simultaneously when exposed to multiple GE traits. However, having multiple 
stacked traits built into the plant may also be detrimental because it is impossible to limit 
exposure to GE traits when the severity of a pest infestation is not bad enough to justify 
the expense of management, thereby making pests less controllable in the future with 
little if any contemporary benefit in return.  
Additionally, discovering and commercially developing a new GE trait is both time-
consuming and costly. Once the trait is incorporated into a plant, natural breeding can be 
used to propagate the trait. And it is uncertain how fast pesticide resistance will emerge 
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or even if it will emerge before the next new corn seed traits are discovered (Hurley and 
Frisvold, 2016). Thus, the timing of commercial introduction of pyramided-trait GE corn 
seed is crucial to address the evolution of resistance in pests. 
Apart from studies testing the sensitivity of farmers’ demand for GE corn seeds, little 
is known about how the efficacy of the GE trait is reflected in the price and valued by 
farmers. Taking a step towards filling this gap, the purpose of this chapter is to explore 
how farmers value pyramided seed products as well as stacked seed products. This 
analysis is related to, but distinct from previous work that assesses the value farmers 
place on general GE traits. This analysis focuses more on how the GE traits are combined 
into seeds, both by stacking and pyramiding. To achieve this, the seed products are 
grouped in two dimensions: by the number of pests the embedded traits target for control 
(Shi, Chavas and Stiegert, 2010; Shi, Chavas, Stiegert and Meng, 2012; Ciliberto, 
Moschini and Perry, 2017), and by the total number of traits in the seed. Additionally, by 
using more recent data (2000-2014), we are able to capture more details of farmers’ 
multi-trait seed purchases, compared to work done by Shi, Chavas and Stiegert (2010), 
using data to 2007; or by Ciliberto, Moschini and Perry (2017) using data to 2011. 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 3.2, we provide an overview of the U.S. 
corn seed market, followed by a description of data used in the econometric analysis. 
Section 3.3 presents an explicit discrete-choice farmers’ seed demand model. The 
estimation method and econometric results are then presented. Finally, we discuss the 
empirical findings and their implications.  
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3.2 The U.S. Corn Seed Market 
We use proprietary U.S. corn seed market data (collected by GfK Kynetee)
17
 for the 
empirical analyses. The data were collected by GfK Kynetec (GfK) using computer 
assisted telephone annual interviews during the month of June. A stratified sample of 
U.S. corn farmers is surveyed, but not all farms surveyed remain in the sample. Thus, the 
data is not a balanced panel. The surveys provide farm-level information on corn seed 
purchases, corn acreage, seed types, seed quantity and seed prices.  
Figure 3.3 displays four maps computed from the GfK data. The maps show the 
allocations of counties surveyed in 2000, 2007, 2010 and 2014. The data do not have 
balanced panel structure, but most of the Midwest corn planting area is covered. To 
create these maps, we sum up the number of traits embedded in each seed, ignoring 
which pest those traits target, and calculate the market share for each seed-type group. 
The maps are filled with the color of the largest seed-type group in each county. We can 
observe that the Midwest states, such as Minnesota, Iowa, Wisconsin and Illinois, are not 
only the major corn planting states, but also quick in adopting new seed varieties and 
with larger scale. Meanwhile, as mentioned by Shi, Chavas and Stiegert (2010), the maps 
also show the spatial heterogeneity in the U.S. corn seed market. For example, in 2014, 
despite the rapid adoption of sextuple-trait seed in Minnesota, conventional and single-
trait seed still dominate in some crop reporting districts (CRDs) in Wyoming.  
Together with Table 3.1, and the plots in Figure 3.4, the evolution of seed products 
can be captured. Before 2000, GE seeds were not adopted by most of the farms. By 2000, 
around 30% of corn acres are planted with single-trait seed. The demand for double-trait 
                                                 
17
 Web address: www.gfk.com. The seed data set is one of their products, called TraitTrak. 
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ECB- and HT-trait seed has been large since around 2005, and shortly after that, triple-
trait ECB-, CRW-, and HT-trait seed has held the market since. Over the past decades, 
the market share for conventional seed dropped from 98.2% in 1995 to 6.2% in 2014. 
On the other hand, the market has been becoming more diverse. Figure 3.5 shows 
changes in seed product diversity in the market since 2000. The four maps display the 
values of the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI), calculated by squaring the market share 
of each seed type
18
 competing in a market, and then summing the resulting numbers, 
which produces an index ranging from zero to one. The market would be dominated by 
one seed product with a HHI equal to 1; and the variety of products increases as the value 
of HHI approaches zero. The value 0.18 is taken as a threshold; an HHI with value below 
0.18 would indicate a moderately concentrated market (Diallo and Tomek, 2015). Again, 
though the HHI density is moving toward zero gradually, there are still some local CRDs 
with a high concentration in seed products.  
Figure 3.6 displays the changes in market structure since 2000. Except for some 
CRDs, monopolistic market structure is not prevalent across the U.S. Corn Belt. The 
average low values of HHI of seed types may not look as optimistic if we take a look at 
Figure 3.7.  Fernandez-Cornejo (2004) stated that the corn seed industry was dominated 
by six
19
 large biotech firms. While the data used in this analysis specify five big parent 
company names, and cluster all the other seed companies into “other”, Figure 3.7 
indicates that, around 70% of seeds purchased in recent years are from Monsanto and 
Dupont. Even though the other three companies experience some market share loses (see 
                                                 
18
 Again, the seed types used in the map are groups of seed products with same number of traits. 
19 
Six biotech firms: Monsanto, Syngenta, Dow Agrosciences, DuPont, Bayer CropScience, and 
BASF.  
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Table 3.2), the sum of the big 5 companies’ market share has been maintained around 
85% of the total market share for the last two decades.   
The prices of seed products have been growing over the years. As displayed in Table 
3.3 and Figure 3.8, the average prices of nearly all seed products have doubled compared 
to that of the first year the product was introduced to the market. Across the seed 
products, the price of ECB-CRW-HT stacked seed is about 25 dollars more than the price 
of conventional seed in recent years.  
3.3 The Model  
Suppose a farmer’s utility is the utility from the consumption of all products (including 
conventional product) available in the market, together with consumption of an outside 
good. Let 𝑞𝑛 denote the quantity purchased of a product 𝑛, where 𝑛 = 0 represents the 
outside good. The farmer chooses product such that: 
max
𝑞0,𝑞1,…,𝑞50
𝑢0(𝑞0) + 𝑢1(𝑞1) + 𝑢2(𝑞2) + ⋯+ 𝑢𝑛(𝑞𝑛) 
s.t.,             ∑ {𝑞𝑗𝑝𝑗} ≤ 𝑦
𝑛
𝑗=0  
                                                                   ∑ {𝑞𝑗} ≤ 1
𝑛
𝑗=0 . 
3.1 
The first constraint is the budget constraint, and the second constraint requires that the 
farmer can buy no more than one of the 𝑛 products, or the outside good (𝑞0 = 1). This 
gives us the standard multinomial logit model. If the farmer were to buy corn seed 
product 𝑗 in market 𝑡, the utility function reduces to the following form (Nevo, 2000): 
𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖(𝑦𝑖 − 𝑝𝑗𝑡) + 𝐱𝑗𝑡𝛃𝒊 + 𝜉𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡, 3.2 
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where 𝑦𝑖 is the income of farmer 𝑖. Since the farm income is unobserved for this study, 
we assume it does not vary across time. The observed price of seed product 𝑗 in market 𝑡 
is 𝑝𝑗𝑡. Vector 𝐱𝑗𝑡 comprises indicator variables that code for the presence of one or more 
GE traits, and GE trait bundle methods in seed product 𝑗 in market 𝑡 (these variables take 
value zero for conventional seed products). The variable 𝜉𝑗𝑡is a disturbance scalar for 
unobserved characteristics of product 𝑗  in market 𝑡 , and 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡  is the usual unobserved 
disturbance with mean zero. Parameters to be estimated are 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛃𝒊 where 𝛼𝑖 is farmer 
𝑖’s marginal utility of income and 𝛃𝒊 is the marginal utilities of the alternative product 
characteristics. If farmer 𝑖 chooses not to buy any product (neither conventional seed nor 
GE seed products), there will be an outside option that is normalized with zero price and 
zero characteristics values: 𝑢𝑖0𝑡=𝛼𝑖𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖0𝑡. If all farmers in the market are identical, the 
aggregate utility can be written as: 
𝑢𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼(𝑦 − 𝑝𝑗𝑡) + 𝐱𝒋𝒕𝛃 + 𝜉𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗𝑡.  3.3 
Assuming that 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 follows the Type I extreme-value distribution,
20
 the market share 
of product 𝑗 can be derived as: 
                                                 
20
 If the Type I extreme-value distribution has mean zero and a scale parameter of 1, it has the 
density and cumulative distribution  𝑓(𝑥) = 𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑒
−𝑥
 and 𝐹(𝑥) = 𝑒−𝑒
−𝑥
. Thus, the more draws, 
the bigger the expected maximum. 
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𝑠1𝑡 = Pr(𝑢𝑖𝑗 ≥ 𝑢𝑖𝑘, ∀𝑘) 
= 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝛼(𝑦 − 𝑝1𝑡) + 𝐱𝟏𝒕𝛃 + 𝜉1𝑡 + 𝜀1𝑡 > 𝛼(𝑦 − 𝑝2𝑡) + 𝐱𝟐𝒕𝛃 + 𝜉2𝑡 + 𝜀2𝑡) 
∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝛼(𝑦 − 𝑝1𝑡) + 𝐱𝟏𝒕𝛃 + 𝜉1𝑡 + 𝜀1𝑡 > 𝛼(𝑦 − 𝑝3𝑡) + 𝐱𝟑𝒕𝛃 + 𝜉3𝑡 + 𝜀3𝑡) 
∗ … 
∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝛼(𝑦 − 𝑝1𝑡) + 𝐱𝟏𝒕𝛃 + 𝜉1𝑡 + 𝜀1𝑡 > 𝛼(𝑦 − 𝑝𝑛𝑡) + 𝐱𝒏𝒕𝛃 + 𝜉𝑛𝑡 + 𝜀𝑛𝑡) 
∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝛼(𝑦 − 𝑝1𝑡) + 𝐱𝟏𝒕𝛃 + 𝜉1𝑡 + 𝜀1𝑡 > 𝛼𝑦 + 𝜀0𝑡) 
=
𝑒
𝐱𝒋𝒕𝛃−𝛼𝑝𝑗𝑡+𝜉𝑗𝑡
𝑒0+∑ 𝑒𝐱𝒌𝒕𝛃−𝛼𝑝𝑘𝑡+𝜉𝑘𝑡𝑛𝑘=1
, 
3.4 
in which, 𝑒0 = 1 is from the outside good, because it adds 0 to utility. Therefore, the 
market share of outside product is 𝑠1𝑡 =
1
1+∑ 𝑒𝐱𝒌𝒕𝛃−𝛼𝑝𝑘𝑡+𝜉𝑘𝑡𝑛𝑘=1
.  Rearranging the 
market share equation, a linear estimating equation is obtained: 
ln(𝑠𝑗𝑡) − ln(𝑠0𝑡) = 𝐱𝒋𝒕𝛃 − 𝛼𝑝𝑗𝑡 + 𝜉𝑗𝑡. 3.5 
The corresponding price elasticities are: 𝜂𝑘𝑡 = {
−𝛼𝑝𝑘𝑡(1 − 𝑠𝑗𝑡), 𝑗 = 𝑘
𝛼𝑝𝑘𝑡𝑠𝑘𝑡,                 𝑗 ≠ 𝑘
, such that the 
own-price elasticity is inversely proportional to its own price, and cross-price elasticity 
depends on price and market share of product 𝑘. The cross-price elasticity is unrealistic, 
because it implies that if product 𝑘 raises its price, it loses farmers equally to each other 
product. Despite the problematic implication for elasticities, we choose to use this Logit 
model to estimate for following reasons.  
First, from the data we are using for this analysis, there are over 1,500 companies 
selling corn seed in the U.S. corn seed market. Their products may include conventional 
and/or GE seeds, where GE seeds can be single-trait or multiple-traits. If seeds have 
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multiple traits, it can be stacked seed, pyramided seed or stacked/pyramided seed. To date, 
for either pests (such as ECB and CRW used in the analysis), or HT, there are 2 to 4 
different traits
21
 commercialized in the U.S. corn seed market. Therefore, the main 
difference among all seed products is how the company combines the traits, and which 
traits they use. It will be ideal if we can assume farmers behave randomly, and utility is 
associated with both fixed coefficients and observed/unobservable farm-level 
characteristics, which is the so-called “BLP Method” of econometric estimation, named 
after Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995). However, we were unable to conduct BLP 
method due to a lack of fine data on observable farm characteristics.  
Second, considering all the PIP traits targeting ECB and CRW, and HT traits 
commercialized and available in the U.S. corn seed market, there are 33 types of trait 
combinations observed in the data. Figure 3.2 shows the changes of market shares for all 
seed products. The product labeled C1 represents the conventional corn seed; it occupied 
the market until GE seed was introduced in 1995. Over time, there were single- and 
double-trait seeds sold in the market, and lately quintuple- and sextuple-trait seeds 
(labeled C28-C33 in Figure 3.2) started to show up and gain market share. A number of 
seed products disappeared not long after market introduction. Given the large amount of 
short life-cycle seed products, it is difficult to apply the Almost Ideal Demand System 
(AIDS) specification of Deaton and Muellbauer (1980). The AIDS model emphasizes the 
product space, rather than characteristic space. When applying the AIDS model, 
estimating the demand of a new product, or a short life-cycle product requires estimates 
                                                 
21
 Three traits targeting ECB: Cry1Ab; Cry1A.105+Cry2AB2; Cry1F. 
Four traits targeting CRW: eCry3.1Ab; Cry3Bb1; Cry34Ab1/Cry35Ab1; mCry3A. 
Two HT targeting weeds generally: PAT(LL); EPSPS(RR/GT). 
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of all the parameters associated with that product. This limits the applicability of the 
model in the seed market case, because there is not enough data to estimate those 
parameters. 
Ciliberto, Moschini and Perry (2017) develop a discrete-choice model of 
differentiated products for the corn and soybean seed industry in the U.S. by using the 
same data as this analysis. They model the demand for corn and soybean seed products 
using a two-level nested logit specification (Verboven 1996; Bjornerstedt and Verboven 
2016). In their model setting, they consider two subgroups (one for soybean seed 
products and the other for corn seed products) as the inside options. Their outside option 
is planting a crop other than corn or soybeans, or not planting at all. GE soybean seeds 
are only embedded with at most two HT traits.  We do not think the presence of GE 
soybean seeds and these traits will affect the relative odds between single- and multiple- 
stack corn seeds, or between pyramid- and non-pyramid corn seeds. Also, this analysis 
does not consider crop rotation by including soybean seed products. Thus, there are no 
independent groups that can be used to specify a hierarchical model, such as the nested 
logit model. 
3.4 Estimation 
We use GfK U.S. corn seed market data spanning the period of 2000 to 2014 for 
empirical analyses. The surveys provide farm-level information on corn seed purchases, 
corn acreage, seed types, seed quantity and seed prices. During the 2000-2014 timeframe, 
the data contain 230,644 transactions from 81 USDA CRDs. Each farm could and most 
farms did purchase different corn seed types each year. Therefore, this analysis considers 
only transactions, rather than farms. 
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Given the overview of the U.S. corn seed market, we choose to use data from the 
2000-2014 timeframe, during which period we can observe the most variation in seed 
types, seed prices, and seed product market shares. We use a stage indicator which 
divides the 15 years into 2000-2004, 2005-2009 and 2010-2014 based on the seed variety 
evolution process discussed above. Geographically, we use data from the U.S. Corn Belt 
(Stiegert et al., 2011), shown in Figure 3.9. The whole colored area describes the U.S. 
Corn Belt. 
Define a market as a CRD-year combination. Then, from the 2000-2014 timeframe on 
the Corn Belt, there are in total 1,205 markets with sample size of 19,822. Define a 
product as a seed company-seed trait combination. There are 6 company groups: 5 big 
companies and “other”; 8 seed trait types (conventional, ECB-single, CRW-single, HT-
single, ECB-HT-double, ECB-CRW-double, CRW-HT-double, and ECB-CRW-HT-
triple), which results in 48 products. We treat all the products sold by “other” companies 
as the outside options for farmers.  
The independent variables include price, seed trait stacking dummy variables, seed 
trait pyramiding dummy variable, number of years since introduction, and lagged county-
level yearly yield.
22
 Table 3.4 displays the variable summary statistics.  
There are three types of price available in the data: price/bag, price/unit, and 
price/acre. In this study, we use price/acre given that the planting density of corn seed is 
unknown and can be random from farm to farm.  
                                                 
22
 County level yearly corn yield data are from USDA survey data.  
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There are 4 seed trait stacking dummy variables, showing if the seed is conventional, 
single-stacked, double-stacked or triple-stacked. Seed trait pyramiding dummies may 
take either 1, pyramided, or 0 otherwise. Seed trait stacking dummies and pyramiding 
dummies capture the most important corn seed characteristics, as well as how the seed 
products are differentiated from each other.  
We also include two variables to indicate the possible efficacy of the seed varieties: 
number of years since introduction and lagged yield. The number of years since 
introduction is suggested to have a length-of-usage, or dependability and trust effect on 
demand for seed varieties (Houston, Jeong and Fletcher, 1989). On one hand, it shows 
how satisfied with previous use or how loyal the farmer is to the brand. It also gives us 
the duration for which pests are exposed to the seed variety, and how likely a pest 
develops resistance to the seed trait.  
Ideally, we can have the average experimental yield for each variety in the market, 
which would show how efficient the seed variety is at boosting agricultural production. 
Lacking of the experimental yield data, we assume that the yield obtained from previous 
year, which may reflect the efficacy of seed products purchased in that year, have an 
influence on farmers’ choice of seed for this coming year.   
One econometric issue in the specification in equation (3.5) is the endogeneity of 
price.  There is no problem assuming that each farm’s demand had no effect on the 
market price. If one farm changes its corn seed purchase plan by not buying one seed 
product, the decrease in sales of that seed product would be so small to be statistically 
estimated. However, the unobservable variables included in 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡  for farm 𝑖 , can also 
change farm 𝑗’s seed purchase (Rasmusen, 2006). If a large number of farms change their 
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seed purchases due to the effect of an unobserved variable, then the market supply and 
demand equilibrium will move to a new point, resulting in a new market price. Since the 
data used for estimation are aggregated at the market level, endogenous price can be a 
major concern for identification.  
To solve the problem of price endogeneity, instrumental variables will be needed. In 
this study, we use BLP instruments which represent functions of the characteristics in 
competing products (Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes, 1995). Ciliberto, Moschini and Perry 
(2017) use the sums of numbers of competing GE seed products by market, parent 
company, and crop as instruments for prices, and evaluate values farmers place on the 
seed product. While our research objects are the combinations of traits, we use the sums 
of ECB, CRW, and HT traits inserted in the competing products in the same market. The 
intuition for this set of instruments is that the trait combination in other competing seed 
products has no direct impact on farm utility for seed product, but through competition, 
the instruments will impact the prices of the seed products farmers purchase. 
To address the price endogeneity problem, we first test for possible endogeneity of 
price using Durbin-Wu-Hausman test (Wooldrige, 1995). The test is robust and there is 
strong evidence supporting the endogeneity assumption. To test if the instruments are 
weakly correlated with the endogenous variables, we conduct Stock and Yogo tests 
(Stock and Yogo, 2005) and Shea’s Partial-𝑅2 test (Shea, 1997).  The test results show 
strong evidence against the weak instrument null hypothesis. We check the robustness of 
regression results using 2SLS, GMM and LIML. 
We also run 2SLS regression with different fixed effects as robustness tests. 
Geographically, shown in Figure 3.9, Stiegert et al. (2011) divide the U.S. Corn Belt into 
89 
 
the core and the fringe. The fringe, the light red region, is best described as a corn 
producing region that is less productive than the core, the dark red center region, and with 
more competing crops grown than in the core. Stiegert et al. claim that the observed 
pricing schemes of GE corn varieties benefit farmers more in the fringe than in the core 
region of the Corn Belt. Given the fact that some states are partially in the core, while, 
other states are completely in/out of the core, we group the states into three types, and 
add the state-core fixed effect to examine if farm adoption changes based on the location 
in the Corn Belt.  
Another geographical fixed effect we to check the robustness of the results is the 
Farm Resource Regions defined in the USDA Economic Research Service (ERS) report 
(AIB-760, August 2000). As shown in Figure 3.10, the Corn Belt consists of 5 regions 
designated at the county level. We also include year fixed effects and 5-year interval 
fixed effects to control for unobservable heterogeneity. 
3.5 Empirical Results 
Equation (3.5) is estimated using 2SLS with heteroscedastic-robust standard errors. Table 
3.5 reports the results. For purpose of comparison, the ordinary least squares (OLS) 
estimation results are also reported in column 4. The OLS estimate of the price differs 
substantially from the 2SLS result, suggesting that prices are indeed endogenous 
(Ciliberto, Moschini and Perry, 2017; Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes, 1995; Trjtenberg, 
1989). 
The coefficients of the stacking dummies and pyramiding dummy show statistically 
significant price premiums. In all cases, the estimates are significantly positive implying 
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that farmers are willing to pay a positive amount for each stacked or/and pyramided trait. 
The same conclusions have been drawn by Ciliberto, Moschini and Perry (2017), except 
that they do not look into the pyramiding effects. However, this result is different from 
the sub-additive pricing of stacked GE trait varieties found by Shi, Chavas, and Stiegert 
(2010). From the coefficient estimates, farmers’ willingness to pay for various 
combinations of GE corn seed traits can be calculated.  
Table 3.7 contains willingness-to-pay (WTP) estimates for each of the GE-trait 
combinations in each of the three 5-year periods. Because all prices in the analysis are 
inflated by inflation rate normalized to equal 1 in 2000, all estimates are in real terms 
(2000 dollars). All of the estimates appear reasonable and are in line with what might be 
expected given knowledge of seed prices and the observed adoption patterns by farmers. 
The WTP for the single-stacked corn seed was $5.72 per acre in the first 5-year-period, 
dropped to $4.27/acre in the 2005-2010 sub-period, and then rose to $18.37/acre in the 
2010-2014 sub-period. Pyramided seeds are valued more by farmers compared to 
stacked-only seed. A similar pattern occurred for the double/triple stacked traits. The 
drop of value in the 2005-2010 sub-period may result from the drop of corn price. In the 
2010-2014 sub-period, corn price increased rapidly hitting record highs in 2012. The 
increase in output price likely increased farmer WTP, thus, value of single stacked seed 
products were tripled from 2005-2010 to 2010-2014; and the value of other stacked seed 
also increased significantly, or doubled.  
The five-year period dummies are expected to capture the adoption trend we 
discussed above. The coefficients show that, farmers would pay less for the GE corn seed 
varieties from 2005 to 2010, compared to the amount they would pay in other two 
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timeframes. After combining these coefficient estimates of GE traits, the five-year 
dummy indicates that, between the year of 2005 and 2010, a farmer would like to pay 
$6.3 less per acre in order to purchase single-trait, non-pyramided GE seed against 
conventional seed, $0.3 less per acre if the single-trait seed is pyramided. This explains 
some of the adoption trend seen in Figure 3.4 where the market share of single-trait seed 
peaked before the year of 2005 at around 40% of the market, and then dropped to 20% 
soon after. A similar trend can be found in Table 3.1 where the market share of ECB 
single-stacked seed decreased rapidly from 20.7% in 2003 to 2.1% in 2008.  There is no 
significant time effect from 2010 to 2014, the statistically significant price premiums 
during that period mainly come from farmers’ values placed on the GE trait varieties.  
In all specifications, the coefficients for the number of years since introduction are 
significantly positive. This implies that farmers would pay more for seed products that 
they have previously used, which could signal product loyalty. The coefficient estimates 
of lagged yield are significantly positive, though the impact was quite small. The results 
indicate that these two seed product efficacy indicators are valid and significantly 
positive values are placed on them by farmers.   
Table 3.6 shows the estimation results for four different specifications which differ by 
the types of fixed effects used to control unobserved heterogeneity. The year fixed effects 
control for temporal changes, while the state-core, and farm resource region fixed effects 
control for unobserved, time-invariant regional effects. The company fixed effects control 
for unobserved seed company related effects. Results from the first three columns remain 
mostly unchanged, though the values of all estimates are almost doubled when we 
remove the spatial fixed effects in column 3. This may reflect the fact that the 
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geographical effects control for spatial unobservable differences in seed products that are 
correlated with prices, such as pest resistance pressure, and weed pressure.  
3.6 Concluding Remarks 
Results of the present analysis provide direct evidence that farmers value both ways in 
which GE corn seed traits have been bundled.  The number of traits embedded in seed 
products grows rapidly in recent years, even if they are targeting the same three pest 
issues as two decades ago. This may result from the evolution of pest resistance to the GE 
traits after exposure to the GE seed varieties for about twenty years. In this respect, the 
efficacy of GE seed traits is expected to be an increasingly important element of farmers’ 
demand for seed products.  
This analysis assesses the stacking and pyramiding strategies in seed bundling, and 
considers the efficacy-related factors, such as whether the seed is pyramiding with traits, 
number of years since the seed product was introduced to the market, and lagged yield. 
We observed that, all the factors are significantly important to farmers’ seed purchasing 
choices.  
This approach is of practical interest to policy makers and companies in the GE seed 
industry if we extend the work by integrating this demand model with a biological model 
of the evolution of pest resistance. It would be very interesting to understand how the 
business strategy of introducing one more GE seed trait can eventually affect the 
sustainability and resilience of agricultural productivity, and what the policy value is to 
regulate the commercialization of the GE seed traits.  
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Table 3.1 GE Corn Trait Adoption, U.S. (% of planted acres) 
Year 
Conven- 
tional 
CB RW HR CB-RW CB-HR RW-HR 
CB-
RW-HR 
1995 98.22%     1.78%         
1996 96.55% 0.70% 
 
2.74% 
    1997 91.61% 4.93% 
 
3.46% 
    1998 77.30% 14.25% 
 
5.33% 
 
3.11% 
  1999 71.85% 18.72% 
 
7.26% 
 
2.17% 
  2000 69.43% 19.37% 
 
9.22% 
 
1.97% 
  2001 68.03% 15.43% 
 
11.26% 
 
5.28% 
  2002 60.45% 19.25% 
 
13.46% 
 
6.84% 
  2003 57.82% 20.73% 0.27% 12.66% 
 
8.52% 
  2004 50.40% 18.45% 1.01% 16.07% 0.06% 13.44% 0.56% 
 2005 38.95% 16.29% 1.20% 20.01% 0.80% 20.50% 1.24% 1.00% 
2006 33.53% 10.54% 1.20% 20.83% 1.84% 24.45% 2.30% 5.32% 
2007 20.69% 5.59% 0.41% 20.26% 1.36% 29.59% 2.30% 19.80% 
2008 12.88% 2.06% 0.08% 20.78% 0.38% 24.29% 0.84% 38.70% 
2009 10.16% 1.29% 0.03% 21.10% 0.43% 20.22% 0.30% 46.47% 
2010 10.26% 0.58% 0.01% 21.37% 0.13% 16.30% 0.36% 50.99% 
2011 8.07% 0.33% 0.00% 19.97% 0.09% 17.22% 0.55% 53.76% 
2012 7.77% 0.30% 0.04% 18.84% 0.04% 20.88% 0.66% 51.47% 
2013 7.10% 0.39% 0.00% 13.68% 0.01% 26.16% 0.55% 52.10% 
2014 6.17% 0.08%   10.86% 0.04% 27.24% 0.28% 55.32% 
    Source: Computed from GfK Trait Track data. 
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Table 3.2 U.S. Corn Seed Market Concentration 
---- Market Shares of the Big 5 Companies, 1995-2014 
year Monsanto Dupont Syngenta 
Dow 
Agro- 
sciences 
Agreliant big5 
1995 18.6% 42.0% 15.9% 9.5% 1.9% 87.9% 
1996 18.6% 42.2% 14.8% 9.5% 2.2% 87.3% 
1997 20.0% 38.2% 16.4% 9.9% 2.2% 86.8% 
1998 20.7% 35.9% 18.0% 9.5% 2.8% 86.9% 
1999 20.3% 41.3% 15.1% 8.0% 3.5% 88.2% 
2000 18.5% 39.4% 16.1% 8.1% 4.3% 86.3% 
2001 19.2% 37.8% 16.1% 8.5% 3.7% 85.4% 
2002 20.4% 37.0% 15.3% 7.4% 3.8% 83.8% 
2003 20.5% 37.1% 14.6% 6.4% 4.5% 83.1% 
2004 22.6% 35.4% 14.4% 6.0% 4.6% 83.0% 
2005 26.1% 33.7% 14.3% 5.3% 4.6% 84.0% 
2006 27.5% 33.8% 12.3% 4.9% 5.8% 84.3% 
2007 30.7% 32.0% 9.8% 4.7% 5.8% 82.9% 
2008 33.5% 33.7% 7.4% 5.0% 6.0% 85.6% 
2009 34.4% 33.5% 8.1% 4.5% 5.7% 86.3% 
2010 33.1% 34.4% 7.3% 4.3% 6.3% 85.4% 
2011 34.5% 33.8% 7.2% 4.4% 6.9% 86.7% 
2012 34.6% 34.5% 6.5% 4.2% 6.6% 86.4% 
2013 34.1% 35.3% 6.0% 4.5% 6.4% 86.3% 
2014 34.1% 33.3% 5.8% 5.6% 6.9% 85.6% 
         Source: Computed from GfK Trait Track data. 
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Table 3.3 Inflation Adjusted Corn Seed Prices 
(in 2000 dollar/acre) 
year 
Conven- 
tional 
CB RW HR 
CB-
RW 
CB-
HR 
RW-
HR 
CB-
RW-
HR 
2000 21.78 28.04 
 
23.78 
 
26.06 
  2001 21.65 28.64 
 
23.94 
 
27.04 
  2002 21.66 28.20 
 
23.68 
 
27.81 
  2003 22.07 28.03 31.58 24.18 
 
28.51 
  2004 22.21 28.52 32.30 24.57 33.30 29.37 33.36 
 2005 22.12 26.57 29.17 24.99 32.73 28.85 32.47 33.84 
2006 22.45 27.04 29.21 26.22 33.27 29.87 33.61 37.29 
2007 22.31 26.41 29.69 26.73 31.34 29.44 31.56 34.40 
2008 25.38 29.52 29.01 33.14 35.86 35.03 40.10 43.16 
2009 30.13 34.69 26.06 40.16 45.20 41.56 44.44 54.21 
2010 31.72 37.81 30.12 42.48 47.92 44.01 45.60 56.47 
2011 32.05 41.35 46.87 42.21 34.48 45.06 54.81 56.11 
2012 35.70 48.89 42.85 46.45 47.91 49.42 61.67 60.20 
2013 38.22 55.96 40.30 47.77 54.34 52.15 61.90 63.51 
2014 40.14 55.14 
 
47.57 69.26 54.16 57.29 65.75 
    Source: Computed from GfK Trait Track data 
. 
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Table 3.4 Summary Statistics 
Variable          Description 
Price Averaged price of a product in a market, inflation adjusted 
in 2000 US dollars/acre  
Stacking Pattern 
Dummies 
Stacking Patterns include: conventional seed (base group); 
single-trait seed; double-trait seed, and triple-trait seed 
Pyramiding Dummy 1 if traits are pyramiding in the seed; 0 otherwise 
NumYear Number of years since introduction 
Yield Lagged county level annual corn yield from USDA survey 
data.  
5 Year Group 
Dummies 
Year can fall into [2000,2005); [2005,2010); and 
[2010,2014]. 
      Variable          Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Price 19,822 43.7199 16.6412 2.5217 111.6796 
Stacking Pattern 19,822 2.3255 0.9771 1 4 
Pyramiding  19,822 0.1644 0.5027 0 3 
NumYear 19,822 9.5177 4.6375 1 20 
Yield 19,822 137.4943 8.2741 19 201 
5-Year Group 19,822 2.0027 0.7635 1 3 
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Table 3.5 2SLS, GMM, LIML and OLS Regression with Robust Standard Errors 
  2SLS GMM LIML OLS 
Price -0.249*** -0.259*** -0.304*** -0.0112*** 
 
(0.0192) (0.0195) (0.0272) (0.00154) 
Stacking-single 1.425*** 1.514*** 1.847*** -0.394*** 
 
(0.158) (0.161) (0.219) (0.0350) 
Stacking-double 3.504*** 3.668*** 4.320*** -0.0104 
 
(0.297) (0.303) (0.416) (0.0513) 
Stacking-triple 7.780*** 8.091*** 9.215*** 1.595*** 
 
(0.524) (0.533) (0.734) (0.0795) 
Pyramiding 0.839*** 0.866*** 0.953*** 0.349*** 
 
(0.0716) (0.0735) (0.0894) (0.0310) 
Years Since Introduced 0.255*** 0.263*** 0.288*** 0.111*** 
 
(0.0149) (0.0152) (0.0200) (0.00488) 
Lagged Yield 0.00768*** 0.00830*** 0.0112*** -0.00729*** 
 
(0.00260) (0.00267) (0.00318) (0.00137) 
[2005,2010) year effect -0.362*** -0.377*** -0.243*** -0.876*** 
 
(0.0675) (0.0691) (0.0836) (0.0360) 
[2010,2014] year effect 3.148*** 3.304*** 4.136*** -1.111*** 
 
(0.352) (0.359) (0.491) (0.0652) 
Constant 2.129*** 2.240*** 2.809*** -0.802*** 
  (0.397) (0.407) (0.496) (0.193) 
Observations 19822 
Standard errors in parentheses.  * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 3.6  2SLS Regressions with Fixed Effects 
  2SLS 
Price -0.187*** -0.135*** -0.249*** -0.0364*** 
 
(0.0131) (0.0133) (0.0192) (0.00857) 
Stacking-single 0.791*** 0.442*** 1.425*** -0.283*** 
 
(0.0909) (0.0923) (0.158) (0.0877) 
Stacking-double 2.012*** 1.484*** 3.504*** 0.0117 
 
(0.135) (0.137) (0.297) (0.184) 
Stacking-triple 5.125*** 4.303*** 7.780*** 1.644*** 
 
(0.213) (0.215) (0.524) (0.344) 
Pyramiding 0.508*** 0.464*** 0.839*** 0.484*** 
 
(0.0466) (0.0403) (0.0716) (0.0457) 
Years Since  0.116*** 0.136*** 0.255*** 0.0834*** 
Introduced (0.0103) (0.00913) (0.0149) (0.0164) 
Lagged Yield 0.00471** 0.00405** 0.00768*** -0.00727*** 
 
(0.00201) (0.00169) (0.00260) (0.00149) 
Year yes yes   
5 Year Intervals   yes  
Company yes yes   
State Core Dummies yes    
Farm Resource Region 
Dummies 
 yes   
Constant 3.061*** 1.553*** 2.129*** -0.213 
  (0.371) (0.391) (0.397) (0.196) 
Observations 19822 
Standard errors in parentheses.  * p<0.10,  ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 3.7 Willingness-to-pay for GE corn seed products (2000$/acre) 
 [2000,2005) [2005,2010) [2010,2014] 
Single stacked 5.72 4.27 18.37 
Single stacked + pyramided 9.09 7.64 21.73 
Double stacked 14.07 12.62 26.71 
Double stacked + pyramided 17.44 15.99 30.08 
Triple stacked 31.24 29.79 43.89 
Triple stacked + pyramided 34.61 33.16 47.26 
WTP estimates are based on the estimated coefficients of column 1 in Table 3.5.   
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Figure 3.1 Structure of the Corn Seed Product 
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Figure 3.2 Market Share of Corn Seed Product in the U.S. Corn Seed Market 
– Seeds with Different Traits and Traits Combinations 
 
             Source: Computed from GfK Trait Track data. 
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Figure 3.3 Corn Seed GE Trait Adoption in the U.S. Market 
--- Largest Seed-Type Group
23
 in Each County; Source: Computed from GfK Trait Track data 
  
  
 
                                                 
23
 Seeds are grouped by the total number of traits embedded, thus the seeds can be stacking, pyramiding or both. 
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Figure 3.4 Corn Seed GE Trait Adoption 
---- Computed from GfK Trait Track data 
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Figure 3.5 Corn Seed GE Trait Adoption in the U.S. Market 
---- HHI Index of Seed Type
24
; Computed from GfK Trait Track data 
  
  
                                                 
24
 Seeds are grouped by the total number of traits embedded, thus the seeds can be stacking, pyramiding or both. 
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Figure 3.6 Corn Seed Market Concentration in the U.S. Market 
---- HHI Index of Seed Company; Computed from GfK Trait Track data 
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Figure 3.7 Seed Company Market Share 
---- Computed from GfK Trait Track data 
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Figure 3.8 Inflation Adjusted Corn Seed Prices 
---- Computed from GfK Trait Track data 
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Figure 3.9 Map of Core and Fringe Regions of U.S. Corn Belt 
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Figure 3.10 Map of Farm Resource Regions of U.S. Corn Belt 
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4 Conclusion and Discussion 
The advent of commercial GE seed products has substantially changed agricultural 
production in general and also pest management. In addition to the high yield and ease of 
operation, the use of GE seed in crop production creates negative externalities: resistant 
pests. If policymakers want to limit such externalities, an effective, sustainable and 
efficient incentive is desirable. Bearing this in mind, this dissertation investigates farmers’ 
choice over weed resistance management, and farmers’ purchase of GE corn seed which 
hasten the natural selection of resistant pests. The aim of this dissertation is to test 
different factors on their impacts over farmers’ weed resistance management decision, 
and to assess farmers’ demand of GE seed trait combinations. The novelty of our 
approach is the introduction of both economic and behavioral factors in the same model 
of farm weed resistance management, and both stacking and pyramiding levels of GE 
seed trait combination in the same analysis of farmers’ GE seed demand.  
We develop a two-period utility maximizing weed resistance management model (see 
Chapter 2), which is a static foundation for determining the steady-state level of 
interested mechanisms. Such an approach might improve the generalizability of the 
testable hypotheses from theoretical results, which is important for reasonable policy 
recommendations. Empirically, a variety of economic and behavioral factors relate to a 
farmer’s use of a wide range of chemical, mechanical and cultural weed management 
tactics are simultaneously explored for the first time to the best of our knowledge.  
The hypotheses predict how those factors are associated with the diversity of use of 
weed resistance management tactics. After testing these hypotheses with weed 
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management survey data, we found that sustainable weed management is a joint resource 
management problem where the substitution/complementarity relationships among 
farmers’ management efforts can affect farmers’ management decision. When efforts are 
mutual strategic substitutes/complements, it’s hard to predict farmer’s management 
decision; however, if other farmers’ efforts are complementary to one side, and substitute 
to the other side, farmer’s weed management effort will be definitive. Our results also 
suggested that, if as predicted in the utility-maximizing theory, more risk tolerant farmers 
are using a broader range of management tactics to improve contemporary weed control, 
then programs that reduce farmer production and marketing risk, like federal crop 
insurance programs, can provide less risk tolerant farmers with an incentive to do more to 
manage herbicide resistance. Besides these two findings, we provided evidence of the 
influence of broad economic and behavioral perspectives on the adoption of weed 
resistance management, all of which have implications for policymakers. 
In Chapter 3, unique U.S. corn seed market data allowed us to examine the impact of 
bundling decisions of seed companies on farmer choices. With more recent data, we 
managed to assess the value of different GE seed products in famers, and evaluate the 
premium associated with GE seed products in two dimensions: stacking and pyramiding, 
a main contribution of this study. During recent years, there has been a trend for at least 
some farmer groups to be more concerned about pest resistance problem. Those farmers 
need seed with pyramided traits targeting the same pest, in order to kill pests that have 
evolved resistance, but not cross-resistance. The results revealed that farmers would be 
willing to pay a significantly positive premium for either stacked or/and pyramided seed, 
which confirms the increasing concerns about pest resistance problem. Despite the trait 
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bundling strategy, results also suggested a positive premium associated with possible 
product loyalty or satisfactory experience from previous use.  
Possible extensions of the analysis may be considered.  First, comparing the spatial 
and geopolitical differences in the influence of economic and behavioral factors on the 
adoption of weed resistance management tactics is of interest. Conducting counterfactual 
analysis to determine when to introduce new trait combinations into seed products under 
the pressure of pest resistance and possible pest cross-resistance is also of interest. Finally, 
including new explanatory variables at the farm level, such as the farm size, operation 
cost, the degree of possible pest resistance and information sources, in order to capture 
more farm-related effects on the purchase of GE seed products. Such research could, 
inter alia, shed light on the successful implementation of resistance management related 
policies. 
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